Le samedi 07 mai 2011 à 17:50 +0000, Andrew Bolster a écrit :
> In an 'Ideal World(tm)', the keyring manager
> would accept a valid PAM authentication as being satisfactory.
We *can't* do that. The keyring is a real secure place, thus we can't
just decide to release the passwords: we *need* the master password to
decrypt them. Really.
Fingerprints are not passwords, they are matched against an already
known fingerprint, which has to be stored somewhere, defeating the idea
of protecting your password.
Le samedi 07 mai 2011 à 17:50 +0000, Andrew Bolster a écrit :
> In an 'Ideal World(tm)', the keyring manager
> would accept a valid PAM authentication as being satisfactory.
We *can't* do that. The keyring is a real secure place, thus we can't
just decide to release the passwords: we *need* the master password to
decrypt them. Really.
Fingerprints are not passwords, they are matched against an already
known fingerprint, which has to be stored somewhere, defeating the idea
of protecting your password.