Comment 4 for bug 2047149

Review for Source Package: speexdsp

[Summary]
MIR team ACK under the constraint to resolve the below listed
required TODOs and as much as possible having a look at the
recommended TODOs.
 This does need a security review, so I'll assign ubuntu-security
List of specific binary packages to be promoted to main: libspeexdsp1, libspeexdsp-dev

Notes:
Required TODOs:
- There is no symbol tracking in place. It seems the library is build from C and it should be easy to get that added.
Recommended TODOs:
- The package should get a team bug subscriber before being promoted

[Rationale, Duplication and Ownership]
There is no other package in main providing the same functionality as it’s a split of another package.

[Dependencies]
OK:
- no other Dependencies to MIR due to this
- speexdsp checked with `check-mir`
- all dependencies can be found in `seeded-in-ubuntu` (already in main)
- none of the (potentially auto-generated) dependencies (Depends
  and Recommends) that are present after build are not in main
- no -dev/-debug/-doc packages that need exclusion
- No dependencies in main that are only superficially tested requiring
  more tests now.

[Embedded sources and static linking]
OK:
- no embedded source present
- no static linking
- does not have unexpected Built-Using entries

OK:
- not a go package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- Does not include vendored code

[Security]

OK:
- history of CVEs does not look concerning
- does not run a daemon as root
- does not use webkit1,2
- does not use lib*v8 directly
- does not expose any external endpoint (port/socket/... or similar)
- does not process arbitrary web content
- does not use centralized online accounts
- does not integrate arbitrary javascript into the desktop
- does not deal with system authentication (eg, pam), etc
- does not deal with security attestation (secure boot, tpm, signatures)
- does not deal with cryptography (en-/decryption, certificates,
  signing, ...)
- this makes appropriate (for its exposure) use of established risk
  mitigation features (dropping permissions, using temporary environments,
  restricted users/groups, seccomp, systemd isolation features,
  apparmor, ...)

Problems:
- does parse data formats (files [images, video, audio,
  xml, json, asn.1], network packets, structures, ...) from
  an untrusted source.
-> Needs a security review

[Common blockers]
OK:
- does not FTBFS currently
- no new python2 dependency

Problems:
- does have a trivial test suite than runs as autopkgtest and no upstream tests. Manual test plan requested as it’s processing audio file and the desktop team doesn’t have the capacity to write a decoder tests for that project. An update to the description has been done to include the manual test plan link and will be executed at each upload of the package.

[Packaging red flags]
OK:
- Ubuntu does not carry a delta
- debian/watch is present and looks ok (if needed, e.g. non-native)
- Upstream update history is slow, but the codec doesn’t evolve
- Debian/Ubuntu update history is good
- the current release is packaged
- promoting this does not seem to cause issues for MOTUs that so far
- no massive Lintian warnings
- debian/rules is rather clean
- It is not on the lto-disabled list

Problems:
- There is no symbol tracking in place. It seems the library is build from C and it should be easy to get that added.

[Upstream red flags]
OK:
- no Errors/warnings during the build
- no incautious use of malloc/sprintf (as far as we can check it)
- no use of sudo, gksu, pkexec, or LD_LIBRARY_PATH (usage is OK inside
   tests)
- no use of user nobody
- no use of setuid / setgid
- no important open bugs (crashers, etc) in Debian or Ubuntu
- no dependency on webkit, qtwebkit, seed or libgoa-*
- not part of the UI for extra checks
- no translation present, but none needed for this case (user visible)?