Comment 5 for bug 2068033

Review for Source Package: python-typeguard

[Summary]
MIR team ACK
This does not need a security review
List of specific binary packages to be promoted to main: python3-typeguard

[Rationale, Duplication and Ownership]
There is no other package in main providing the same functionality.
A team is committed to own long term maintenance of this package (ubuntu-openstack).
Bug subscription is in place.
The rationale given in the report seems valid and useful for Ubuntu

[Dependencies]
OK:
- no other Dependencies to MIR due to this
  - python-typeguard checked with `check-mir`
  - all dependencies can be found in `seeded-in-ubuntu` (already in main)
  - none of the (potentially auto-generated) dependencies (Depends
    and Recommends) that are present after build are not in main
  - no -dev/-debug/-doc packages that need exclusion
  - No dependencies in main that are only superficially tested requiring
    more tests now.

Problems: None

[Embedded sources and static linking]
OK:
 - no embedded source present
 - no static linking
 - does not have unexpected Built-Using entries
 - not a go package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
 - not a rust package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard

Problems: None

[Security]
OK:
 - history of CVEs does not look concerning
 - does not run a daemon as root
 - does not use webkit1,2
 - does not use lib*v8 directly
 - does not parse data formats (files [images, video, audio,
   xml, json, asn.1], network packets, structures, ...) from
   an untrusted source.
 - does not expose any external endpoint (port/socket/... or similar)
 - does not process arbitrary web content
 - does not use centralized online accounts
 - does not integrate arbitrary javascript into the desktop
 - does not deal with system authentication (eg, pam), etc)
 - does not deal with security attestation (secure boot, tpm, signatures)
 - does not deal with cryptography (en-/decryption, certificates,
   signing, ...)
 - this makes appropriate (for its exposure) use of established risk
   mitigation features (dropping permissions, using temporary environments,
   restricted users/groups, seccomp, systemd isolation features,
   apparmor, ...)

Problems: None

[Common blockers]

OK:
 - does not FTBFS currently
 - does have a test suite that runs at build time
   - test suite fails will fail the build upon error.
 - does have a non-trivial test suite that runs as autopkgtest
 - This does not need special HW for build or test
 - no new python2 dependency
 - Python package, but using dh_python

Problems: None

[Packaging red flags]
OK:
 - Ubuntu does not carry a delta
 - symbols tracking not applicable for this kind of code.
 - debian/watch is present and looks ok (if needed, e.g. non-native)
 - Upstream update history is good, supporting latest Pythons
 - Debian/Ubuntu update history is good
 - the current release is packaged
 - promoting this does not seem to cause issues for MOTUs that so far
   maintained the package
 - no massive Lintian warnings
 - debian/rules is rather clean
 - It is not on the lto-disabled list
   (fix, or the workaround should be directly in the package,
    see https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lto-disabled-list)

Problems: None

[Upstream red flags]
OK:
 - no Errors/warnings during the build
 - no use of sudo, gksu, pkexec, or LD_LIBRARY_PATH (usage is OK inside
   tests)
 - no use of user nobody
 - no use of setuid / setgid
 - no dependency on webkit, qtwebkit or libseed
 - not part of the UI for extra checks
 - no translation present, but none needed for this case (user visible)?

Problems: None