Under certain conditions there is faulty logic in function tengine_stonith_notify() which can incorrectly add successfully fenced nodes to a list, causing Pacemaker to subsequently erase that node’s status section when the next DC (Designated Controller) election occurs. With the status section erased, the cluster considers that node is down and starts corresponding services on other nodes. Multiple instances of the same service can cause data corruption.
Conditions:
1. fenced node must have been the previous DC and been sufficiently functional to request its own fencing
2. fencing notification must arrive after the new DC has been elected but before it invokes the policy engine
Under certain conditions there is faulty logic in function tengine_ stonith_ notify( ) which can incorrectly add successfully fenced nodes to a list, causing Pacemaker to subsequently erase that node’s status section when the next DC (Designated Controller) election occurs. With the status section erased, the cluster considers that node is down and starts corresponding services on other nodes. Multiple instances of the same service can cause data corruption.
Conditions:
1. fenced node must have been the previous DC and been sufficiently functional to request its own fencing
2. fencing notification must arrive after the new DC has been elected but before it invokes the policy engine
Pacemaker versions affected:
1.1.6 - 1.1.9
Stable Ubuntu releases affected:
Ubuntu 12.04 LTS
Ubuntu 12.10 (EOL?)
Fix:
https:/ /github. com/ClusterLabs /pacemaker/ commit/ f30e1e43
References:
https://<email address hidden> /msg19509. html blog.clusterlab s.org/blog/ 2014/potential- for-data- corruption- in-pacemaker- 1-dot-1- 6-through- 1-dot-1- 9/
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