Comment 2 for bug 10334

Message-ID: <email address hidden>
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2004 15:11:07 -0500
From: Joey Hess <email address hidden>
To: Debian Bug Tracking System <email address hidden>
Subject: timing attack allows attacker to determine valid usernames

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Package: ssh
Version: 1:3.8.1p1-8.sarge.2
Severity: serious
Tags: security

CAN-2003-0190 describes a flaw in ssh's password prompt timing which
makes it easy for an attacker to determine if a username exists on a
machine. I've checked and testing and unstable's versions of ssh are
vulnerable. Details and some fixes are in this message:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=3Dbugtraq&m=3D105172058404810&w=3D2

Feel free to downgrade this bug if you don't feel it's a real security
problem or not RC. I assume upstream must not, since the problem has not
been fixed in over a year. Of course, upstream problably doesn't use ssh
in the vulnerable configuration, with pam.

--=20
see shy jo

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