For Trusty 3.13, add the following patches: * UBUNTU: SAUCE: filter: Use barrier_nospec() instead of osb() * UBUNTU: SAUCE: Rename osb() to barrier_nospec() * UBUNTU: SAUCE: Replace osb() calls with array_index_nospec() * nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() * nospec: Move array_index_nospec() parameter checking into separate macro * nospec: Allow index argument to have const-qualified type * x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation * x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 * nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params * vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution * x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation * x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation * x86: Introduce barrier_nospec * x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec * array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references * Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
For Trusty 3.13, add the following patches: nospec( ) nospec_ mask_check( ) nospec( ) parameter checking into separate macro mask_nospec
* UBUNTU: SAUCE: filter: Use barrier_nospec() instead of osb()
* UBUNTU: SAUCE: Rename osb() to barrier_nospec()
* UBUNTU: SAUCE: Replace osb() calls with array_index_
* nospec: Kill array_index_
* nospec: Move array_index_
* nospec: Allow index argument to have const-qualified type
* x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation
* x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
* nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
* vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
* x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
* x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
* x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
* x86: Implement array_index_
* array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references
* Documentation: Document array_index_nospec