* dbus_backend/ls-dbus-backend: Actually look at the PolicyKit check result
and only proceed if it succeeded. Thanks to Romain Perier for finding this
and providing the patch! This fixes a local root privilege escalation, as
this allows any authenticated user to write arbitrary shell commands into
/etc/default/locale. (LP: #764397) [CVE-2011-0729]
* dbus_backend/ls-dbus-backend: Reject locale names with invalid characters
in it, to further prevent injecting shell code into /etc/default/locale
for authenticated users. Thanks to Felix Geyer for the initial patch!
(LP: #764397)
* dbus_backend/com.ubuntu.LanguageSelector.conf: Allow access to standard
D-BUS introspection and properties interfaces. There's no reason to deny
it, and it causes warnings.
* debian/language-selector-common.postinst: Stop running D-BUS backend on
upgrade.
-- Martin Pitt <email address hidden> Tue, 19 Apr 2011 20:20:44 +0200
This bug was fixed in the package language-selector - 0.33
---------------
language-selector (0.33) natty; urgency=low
* dbus_backend/ ls-dbus- backend: Actually look at the PolicyKit check result default/ locale. (LP: #764397) [CVE-2011-0729] ls-dbus- backend: Reject locale names with invalid characters com.ubuntu. LanguageSelecto r.conf: Allow access to standard language- selector- common. postinst: Stop running D-BUS backend on
and only proceed if it succeeded. Thanks to Romain Perier for finding this
and providing the patch! This fixes a local root privilege escalation, as
this allows any authenticated user to write arbitrary shell commands into
/etc/
* dbus_backend/
in it, to further prevent injecting shell code into /etc/default/locale
for authenticated users. Thanks to Felix Geyer for the initial patch!
(LP: #764397)
* dbus_backend/
D-BUS introspection and properties interfaces. There's no reason to deny
it, and it causes warnings.
* debian/
upgrade.
-- Martin Pitt <email address hidden> Tue, 19 Apr 2011 20:20:44 +0200