* SECURITY UPDATE: When /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable is enabled, crashing a
program that is suid root or not readable for the user would create
root-owned core files in the current directory of that program. Creating
specially crafted core files in /etc/logrotate.d or similar could then
lead to arbitrary code execution with root privileges. Now core files do
not get written for these kinds of programs, in accordance with the
intention of core(5).
Thanks to Sander Bos for discovering this issue!
(CVE-2015-1324, LP: #1452239)
* SECURITY UPDATE: When writing a core dump file for a crashed packaged
program, don't close and reopen the .crash report file but just rewind and
re-read it. This prevents the user from modifying the .crash report file
while "apport" is running to inject data and creating crafted core dump
files. In conjunction with the above vulnerability of writing core dump
files to arbitrary directories this could be exploited to gain root
privileges.
Thanks to Philip Pettersson for discovering this issue!
(CVE-2015-1325, LP: #1453900)
* test_signal_crashes(): Drop hardcoded /tmp/ path in do_crash(),
test_nonwritable_cwd() uses a different dir.
-- Martin Pitt <email address hidden> Wed, 13 May 2015 11:59:03 +0200
This bug was fixed in the package apport - 2.14.7-0ubuntu8.5
---------------
apport (2.14.7-0ubuntu8.5) utopic-security; urgency=medium
* SECURITY UPDATE: When /proc/sys/ fs/suid_ dumpable is enabled, crashing a crashes( ): Drop hardcoded /tmp/ path in do_crash(), nonwritable_ cwd() uses a different dir.
program that is suid root or not readable for the user would create
root-owned core files in the current directory of that program. Creating
specially crafted core files in /etc/logrotate.d or similar could then
lead to arbitrary code execution with root privileges. Now core files do
not get written for these kinds of programs, in accordance with the
intention of core(5).
Thanks to Sander Bos for discovering this issue!
(CVE-2015-1324, LP: #1452239)
* SECURITY UPDATE: When writing a core dump file for a crashed packaged
program, don't close and reopen the .crash report file but just rewind and
re-read it. This prevents the user from modifying the .crash report file
while "apport" is running to inject data and creating crafted core dump
files. In conjunction with the above vulnerability of writing core dump
files to arbitrary directories this could be exploited to gain root
privileges.
Thanks to Philip Pettersson for discovering this issue!
(CVE-2015-1325, LP: #1453900)
* test_signal_
test_
-- Martin Pitt <email address hidden> Wed, 13 May 2015 11:59:03 +0200