Comment 34 for bug 1682411

Right. We do need answers for abstract domain sockets (though from what
you've mentioned, it sounds like we're mostly there already).

This is more about the CVE that we need to get a set of releases out across
the board.

On Sun, May 7, 2017 at 8:26 AM, Andrew Wilkins <<email address hidden>
> wrote:

> It seems my mention of abstract domain sockets was missed, so I'll
> restate in more detail. This doesn't apply to juju-run, but it does
> apply to jujuc (the hook tools: relation-set, relation-get, etc.). The
> jujuc socket is an abstract domain socket, so it has no relationship to
> the filesystem; abstract domain sockets aren't affected by filesystem
> permissions. I think you have to use SCM_CREDENTIALS to do any kind of
> auth on those. This is technically a different bug I guess, but it would
> be good to at least consider how to fix that at the same time.
>
> Seth: on Windows we use named pipes. We'll need to look at whether it is
> similarly affected, but that shouldn't hold up a fix for Linux. Looking
> at the gopkg.in/natefinch/npipe.v2 package, and the CreateNamedPipe
> docs, it appears that the default security descriptor is being used,
> which will restrict full access to administrators and the creator.
>
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> https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1682411
>
> Title:
> juju-run unit root escalation vulnerability
>
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