Comment 17 for bug 634183

(In reply to comment #13)
> No I don't care to be specific.

Then your claim in comment #11 will remain unsubstantiated.

> If you don't understand that
> externally created hardlink's are external to package management,
> and should be dealt with

As I said, this argument is moot because the attack can be performed without creating a hard link (bug 589775 comment #25).

> If you _REALLY_ want to stop escalation, then wipe the
> blocks of erased files before calling unlink(2). Destroying
> the content preventing any possibility of an exploit no matter
> what privileges are attached to the inode. Even simpler would
> be calling ftruncate, though I dare say you will find certain
> libraries that are unhappy having ftruncate(2) called
> while in use won't be happy.

That actually may be a good future-proof solution.

> Attacks against dpkg [...] are utterly irrelevant.

Attacks that also apply to RPM are utterly relevant.