Comment 83 for bug 2059809
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| Jeremy Stanley (fungi) wrote Re: Arbitrary file access through QCOW2 external data file | #83 |
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bbfa235
(Get the code!)
Brian: The upshot of the discussion I was included on with the QEMU developers is that `qemu-img info` relies on the same image driver code that QEMU uses to boot those images, so any vulnerability related to use of untrusted images with QEMU potentially extends to running `qemu-img info` on the same images. It sounds like their plan is to simply update documentation to state that running any of the current QEMU tools on untrusted image files is not a use case they support, and that there's to be no expectation that they'll patch those existing tools to make such use cases safe.
Their guidance was that it's in OpenStack's best interest to perform any image safety checks with a separate validation layer before ever passing those images to QEMU tools. The current round of fixes seems like a good opportunity to add that layer, so that any further exploits which are published impacting qemu-img and related software can be mitigated in the same place.