Should invalidate password reset links when a user changes their primary email address
| Affects | Status | Importance | Assigned to | Milestone | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mahara |
Fix Released
|
Low
|
Unassigned | ||
| 15.04 |
Fix Released
|
Low
|
Unassigned | ||
| 15.10 |
Fix Released
|
Low
|
Unassigned | ||
| 16.04 |
Fix Released
|
Low
|
Unassigned | ||
| 16.10 |
Fix Released
|
Low
|
Unassigned | ||
Bug Description
As reported to us through the mahara.org security bug email address, by Sajibe kanti.
When a user completes the "Forgot password?" password reset process, we delete any remaining password reset links for that user. However, we do not delete these if a user changes their primary email address. As the initial email points out, that could lead to an attack like this:
1. Attacker compromises victim's Mahara account (without changing victim's password).
2. Attacker changes their account's primary email address to the attacker's email address.
3. Attacker uses "Forgot password" page to request a password reset email. They don't immediately use the link in the password reset email; instead they store it for later.
4. Victim realizes their Mahara account is compromised, and logs in to their account.
5. Victim attempts to secure their account by changing their password (through account settings page), and changing their primary email address back to their own.
Expected result: The attacker is locked out of the victim's Mahara account
Actual result: The attacker uses their stored password reset email to change the user's password and re-gain access to their account.
We could help reduce this attack vector, by deleting any outstanding password reset emails for a user, when the user updates their account's primary email address. We should probably also delete any outstanding password reset emails for a user, when they change their account password through the account settings page. It may be worth considering other situations where password reset emails should be deleted, as well.
CVE References
| Aaron Wells (u-aaronw) wrote | #1 |
| Mahara Bot (dev-mahara) wrote A patch has been submitted for review | #2 |
| Mahara Bot (dev-mahara) wrote A change has been merged | #3 |
| Mahara Bot (dev-mahara) wrote A patch has been submitted for review | #4 |
| Mahara Bot (dev-mahara) wrote A change has been merged | #5 |
| Mahara Bot (dev-mahara) wrote A patch has been submitted for review | #6 |
| Mahara Bot (dev-mahara) wrote | #7 |
| Mahara Bot (dev-mahara) wrote | #8 |
| Mahara Bot (dev-mahara) wrote A change has been merged | #9 |
| Mahara Bot (dev-mahara) wrote | #10 |
| Mahara Bot (dev-mahara) wrote | #11 |
| Changed in mahara: | |
| milestone: | 16.10.0 → none |
| Changed in mahara: | |
| status: | Fix Committed → Fix Released |
Setting priority to "Low" because this vulnerability is of limited use:
1. This vulnerability only helps an attacker who has already compromised the victim's Mahara account. It does not offer a means to compromise an account on its own.
2. This attack doesn't allow for an ongoing cycle of compromises. Once used, the attacker will have changed the victim's password, which will lead the victim to use the "Forgot password" page themselves, which deletes all other password reset emails for the user. So, the attacker can only use this once.
3. Mahara password reset emails are only valid for 24 hours. So this method can't be used to re-compromise the account days later when the victim has become less suspicious.