Comment 1 for bug 1754375

Revision history for this message
Stefan Bader (smb) wrote :

Skipped:
* CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre v1 Intel)
  - x86/cpu/AMD: Make LFENCE a serializing instruction
    -> x86/cpu/AMD: Make the LFENCE instruction serialized
  - x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC

* CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline)
  - x86/mm/32: Move setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID) earlier
  - x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value
  - x86/kbuild: enable modversions for symbols exported from asm
  - x86/asm: Make asm/alternative.h safe from assembly
  - EXPORT_SYMBOL() for asm
  - kconfig.h: use __is_defined() to check if MODULE is defined
  - x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
  - x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
  - x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
  - x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
  - x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
  - x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  - x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
  - x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  - x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
  - x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
  - x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning
  - x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros
  - module: Add retpoline tag to VERMAGIC
  - x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors
  - x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected
  - retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk
  - kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes
  - kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk
  - x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB

* bug 1743053:
  - libata: apply MAX_SEC_1024 to all LITEON EP1 series devices