| 2024-04-09 17:47:17 |
Julian Andres Klode |
bug |
|
|
added bug |
| 2024-04-09 17:48:31 |
Julian Andres Klode |
description |
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly. |
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
|
| 2024-04-09 17:50:11 |
Julian Andres Klode |
description |
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release).
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
|
| 2024-04-09 17:50:57 |
Julian Andres Klode |
summary |
Promote weak key warnings to errors |
APT 2.8.0: Promote weak key warnings to errors |
|
| 2024-04-09 17:51:05 |
Julian Andres Klode |
nominated for series |
|
Ubuntu Noble |
|
| 2024-04-09 17:51:05 |
Julian Andres Klode |
bug task added |
|
apt (Ubuntu Noble) |
|
| 2024-04-09 17:51:43 |
Julian Andres Klode |
description |
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release).
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release)
(This may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
|
| 2024-04-09 17:51:54 |
Julian Andres Klode |
description |
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release)
(This may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release)
(This will be uploaded after the beta and may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
|
| 2024-04-09 18:02:23 |
Julian Andres Klode |
description |
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release)
(This will be uploaded after the beta and may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release)
(This will be uploaded after the beta and may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
Other fixes:
- The test suite has been made less flaky in two places
- Documentation translation has been unfuzzied for URL changes in 2.7.14
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
We don't have any tests for the test changes or the documentation translation URL unfuzzying.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
|
| 2024-04-09 18:02:47 |
Julian Andres Klode |
description |
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release)
(This will be uploaded after the beta and may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
Other fixes:
- The test suite has been made less flaky in two places
- Documentation translation has been unfuzzied for URL changes in 2.7.14
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
We don't have any tests for the test changes or the documentation translation URL unfuzzying.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release, safe for some minor translation/test suite improvements)
(This will be uploaded after the beta and may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
Other fixes:
- The test suite has been made less flaky in two places
- Documentation translation has been unfuzzied for URL changes in 2.7.14
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
We don't have any tests for the test changes or the documentation translation URL unfuzzying.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
|
| 2024-04-16 15:12:06 |
Julian Andres Klode |
tags |
|
block-proposed block-proposed-noble |
|
| 2024-04-16 15:12:12 |
Julian Andres Klode |
tags |
block-proposed block-proposed-noble |
block-proposed |
|
| 2024-04-16 15:13:42 |
Julian Andres Klode |
description |
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release, safe for some minor translation/test suite improvements)
(This will be uploaded after the beta and may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
Other fixes:
- The test suite has been made less flaky in two places
- Documentation translation has been unfuzzied for URL changes in 2.7.14
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
We don't have any tests for the test changes or the documentation translation URL unfuzzying.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
⚠️ Only land this in the release pocket after PPAs have been resigned
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release, safe for some minor translation/test suite improvements)
(This will be uploaded after the beta and may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
Other fixes:
- The test suite has been made less flaky in two places
- Documentation translation has been unfuzzied for URL changes in 2.7.14
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
We don't have any tests for the test changes or the documentation translation URL unfuzzying.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
|
| 2024-04-16 15:22:29 |
Jeremy Bícha |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Jeremy Bícha |
| 2024-04-16 15:26:02 |
Julian Andres Klode |
apt (Ubuntu Noble): status |
New |
Triaged |
|
| 2024-04-16 15:26:07 |
Julian Andres Klode |
apt (Ubuntu Noble): assignee |
|
Julian Andres Klode (juliank) |
|
| 2024-04-26 21:51:43 |
Steve Langasek |
apt (Ubuntu Noble): status |
Triaged |
Incomplete |
|
| 2024-04-29 12:34:32 |
Julian Andres Klode |
description |
⚠️ Only land this in the release pocket after PPAs have been resigned
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release, safe for some minor translation/test suite improvements)
(This will be uploaded after the beta and may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
Other fixes:
- The test suite has been made less flaky in two places
- Documentation translation has been unfuzzied for URL changes in 2.7.14
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
We don't have any tests for the test changes or the documentation translation URL unfuzzying.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
⚠️ Only land this in the release/updates pocket after PPAs have been resigned
(This bumps the apt version to 2.8.0. APT uses the odd/even number system, with 2.7.x being the development series for 2.8, and this is the only change left for the 2.8 release, safe for some minor translation/test suite improvements)
(This will be uploaded after the beta and may be released before noble release, as a zero day SRU or within the weeks following the release)
[Impact]
APT is currently just warning about keys that it should be rejecting to give Launchpad time to resign PPAs. This needs to be bumped to an error such that the crypto policy is fully implemented and we only trust keys that are still being trusted. #2055193
A warning provides some help right now to third-parties to fix their repositories, but it's not *safe*: A repository could have multiple signing keys and be signed by a good key now, then later, a previous key still in trusted.gpg.d could be revoked and we'd degrade to warnings, which, given that we update in the background automatically, the user may not see.
Other fixes:
- The test suite has been made less flaky in two places
- Documentation translation has been unfuzzied for URL changes in 2.7.14
[Test plan]
The vast regression test suite prevents regression in other components. Additional tests are:
1. (promotion to error) Take a repository that has a weak key warning, upgrade apt and check that it is an error
2. (still valid) Check that the main Ubuntu repositories and/or resigned PPAs work correctly.
We don't have any tests for the test changes or the documentation translation URL unfuzzying.
[Where problems could occur]
apt will start to fail updates of repositories with weak signing keys, but it will have warned users about that before. Given that it is still early in the cycle, and we only enable updates for 24.04.1, this seems the right tradeoff for future security. |
|
| 2024-04-29 23:18:17 |
Steve Langasek |
apt (Ubuntu Noble): status |
Incomplete |
Fix Committed |
|
| 2024-04-29 23:18:19 |
Steve Langasek |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Ubuntu Stable Release Updates Team |
| 2024-04-29 23:18:20 |
Steve Langasek |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber SRU Verification |
| 2024-04-29 23:18:24 |
Steve Langasek |
tags |
block-proposed |
block-proposed verification-needed verification-needed-noble |
|
| 2024-04-30 09:25:34 |
Kai Kasurinen |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Kai Kasurinen |
| 2024-05-02 11:39:46 |
Rico Tzschichholz |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Rico Tzschichholz |
| 2024-05-03 07:46:46 |
Julian Andres Klode |
tags |
block-proposed verification-needed verification-needed-noble |
verification-needed verification-needed-noble |
|
| 2024-05-07 11:21:14 |
Mitsuya Shibata |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Mitsuya Shibata |
| 2024-05-21 09:57:13 |
Launchpad Janitor |
apt (Ubuntu): status |
Incomplete |
Fix Released |
|
