| 2014-12-11 13:40:32 |
Wouter |
bug |
|
|
added bug |
| 2014-12-11 13:41:18 |
Wouter |
tags |
grub2 secureboot |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot |
|
| 2014-12-11 21:25:00 |
Marc Deslauriers |
information type |
Private Security |
Public Security |
|
| 2014-12-11 21:25:05 |
Marc Deslauriers |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu): status |
New |
Triaged |
|
| 2014-12-11 21:25:08 |
Marc Deslauriers |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu): importance |
Undecided |
Wishlist |
|
| 2015-12-11 03:47:37 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu): status |
Triaged |
In Progress |
|
| 2015-12-11 03:50:07 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
affects |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu) |
grub2 (Ubuntu) |
|
| 2015-12-11 03:50:16 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu): assignee |
|
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre (mathieu-tl) |
|
| 2015-12-14 17:11:10 |
Mario Limonciello |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Mario Limonciello |
| 2016-01-07 06:37:23 |
Anthony Wong |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Ivan Hu |
| 2016-01-07 06:37:35 |
Anthony Wong |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Anthony Wong |
| 2016-01-07 12:02:55 |
Mantas Mikulėnas |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Mantas Mikulėnas |
| 2016-01-28 20:53:49 |
John S. Gruber |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber John S. Gruber |
| 2016-01-28 23:57:06 |
Tim Hitchins |
description |
Me and some other students have conducted some various experiments on Secure Boot enabled machines. The main focus of the tests was to circumvent Secure Boot and load unsigned kernels or kernels that have been signed with other keys.
On your SecureBoot (https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/SecureBoot) it is outlined that GRUB will boot unsigned kernels when the kernel is unsigned. During one of our experiments it seemed that this statement was true and that GRUB loads unsigned kernels as described on your page. We understand that for various reasons GRUB should still support the use-case when an unsigned kernel must be loaded, but with the current approach the user isn't aware if there is a whole chain of trust. For example, it could still be possible to load some malware before it boots the Operating System itself (bootkits). One of the many reasons that Secure Boot has been developed is to protect the user from these kind of attacks.
With the current approach the purpose of Secure Boot is somewhat defeated, and the user doesn't know if the whole chain has been verified or not. It could easily be the case that an unsigned kernel has been loaded by Ubuntu without the user noticing. From our point of view, a better approach would be to inform the user that an unsigned kernel will be loaded and that the user can make a choice if he/she wants to proceed. The default action could be to accept the option, remember the user's option and sometimes remember the user of the fact that it is loading an unsigned kernel.
This problem is of course related to GRUB itself and not to Ubuntu itself. The reason for filing this bug and informing the SecurityTeam of Ubuntu is to ask for their opinions and what your point of view is on the current approach and to see if other users classify this as a "bug".
GRUB2 versions: grub-2.02~beta2, 1.34.1+2.02~beta2-9ubuntu1
Ubuntu version: Trusty (will also affect newer and older versions, GRUB specific problem) |
Me and some other students have conducted some various experiments on Secure Boot enabled machines. The main focus of the tests was to circumvent Secure Boot and load unsigned kernels or kernels that have been signed with other keys.
On your SecureBoot (https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/SecureBoot) it is outlined that GRUB will boot unsigned kernels when the kernel is unsigned. During one of our experiments it seemed that this statement was true and that GRUB loads unsigned kernels as described on your page. We understand that for various reasons GRUB should still support the use-case when an unsigned kernel must be loaded, but with the current approach the user isn't aware if there is a whole chain of trust. For example, it could still be possible to load some malware before it boots the Operating System itself (bootkits). One of the many reasons that Secure Boot has been developed is to protect the user from these kind of attacks.
With the current approach the purpose of Secure Boot is somewhat defeated, and the user doesn't know if the whole chain has been verified or not. It could easily be the case that an unsigned kernel has been loaded by Ubuntu without the user noticing. From our point of view, a better approach would be to inform the user that an unsigned kernel will be loaded and that the user can make a choice if he/she wants to proceed. The default action could be to accept the option, remember the user's option and sometimes remind the user of the fact that it is loading an unsigned kernel.
This problem is of course related to GRUB itself and not to Ubuntu itself. The reason for filing this bug and informing the SecurityTeam of Ubuntu is to ask for their opinions and what your point of view is on the current approach and to see if other users classify this as a "bug".
GRUB2 versions: grub-2.02~beta2, 1.34.1+2.02~beta2-9ubuntu1
Ubuntu version: Trusty (will also affect newer and older versions, GRUB specific problem) |
|
| 2016-02-02 20:43:42 |
Max Martel |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Max Martel |
| 2016-03-07 09:29:09 |
Thorsten Leemhuis |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Thorsten Leemhuis |
| 2016-03-09 02:40:23 |
Shih-Yuan Lee |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Shih-Yuan Lee |
| 2016-03-17 00:50:30 |
Chen-Han Hsiao (Stanley) |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Chen-Han Hsiao (Stanley) |
| 2016-04-22 13:00:14 |
Victor Perevertkin |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Victor Perevertkin |
| 2016-04-27 13:22:21 |
Pedro |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Pedro |
| 2016-05-22 05:01:33 |
James Johnston |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber James Johnston |
| 2016-06-13 10:24:45 |
Sasa Paporovic |
tags |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot xenial |
|
| 2016-06-13 10:25:22 |
Sasa Paporovic |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Sasa Paporovic |
| 2016-07-23 18:09:59 |
Shane Synan |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Shane Synan |
| 2016-07-24 04:05:57 |
Simon May |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Simon May |
| 2016-09-14 15:45:12 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu): status |
In Progress |
Triaged |
|
| 2016-09-14 15:45:18 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu): importance |
Wishlist |
High |
|
| 2016-11-22 05:40:37 |
Marco |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Marco |
| 2016-11-26 13:16:22 |
Mantas Mikulėnas |
removed subscriber Mantas Mikulėnas |
|
|
|
| 2017-03-30 20:06:47 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
description |
Me and some other students have conducted some various experiments on Secure Boot enabled machines. The main focus of the tests was to circumvent Secure Boot and load unsigned kernels or kernels that have been signed with other keys.
On your SecureBoot (https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/SecureBoot) it is outlined that GRUB will boot unsigned kernels when the kernel is unsigned. During one of our experiments it seemed that this statement was true and that GRUB loads unsigned kernels as described on your page. We understand that for various reasons GRUB should still support the use-case when an unsigned kernel must be loaded, but with the current approach the user isn't aware if there is a whole chain of trust. For example, it could still be possible to load some malware before it boots the Operating System itself (bootkits). One of the many reasons that Secure Boot has been developed is to protect the user from these kind of attacks.
With the current approach the purpose of Secure Boot is somewhat defeated, and the user doesn't know if the whole chain has been verified or not. It could easily be the case that an unsigned kernel has been loaded by Ubuntu without the user noticing. From our point of view, a better approach would be to inform the user that an unsigned kernel will be loaded and that the user can make a choice if he/she wants to proceed. The default action could be to accept the option, remember the user's option and sometimes remind the user of the fact that it is loading an unsigned kernel.
This problem is of course related to GRUB itself and not to Ubuntu itself. The reason for filing this bug and informing the SecurityTeam of Ubuntu is to ask for their opinions and what your point of view is on the current approach and to see if other users classify this as a "bug".
GRUB2 versions: grub-2.02~beta2, 1.34.1+2.02~beta2-9ubuntu1
Ubuntu version: Trusty (will also affect newer and older versions, GRUB specific problem) |
[Rationale]
GRUB should help us enforce that in UEFI mode, only signed kernels are loaded. It should not silently fall back to loading unsigned kernels.
[Impact]
All our users booting in UEFI; on all supported releases.
[Test cases]
= grub2 =
Booting unsigned kernels:
1) Try to boot a custom kernel
2) Verify that the kernel will not be loaded by grub (you should see an error message about the signature)
Booting signed kernels:
1) Try to boot an official signed kernel (from -release or -updates)
2) Verify that the system boots normally and no warnings are shown about signature.
[Regression Potential]
Any failure to boot presenting as a failure to load the kernel from within grub, with an "invalid signature" type error message or not, should be investigated as a potential regression of this stable update.
---
Me and some other students have conducted some various experiments on Secure Boot enabled machines. The main focus of the tests was to circumvent Secure Boot and load unsigned kernels or kernels that have been signed with other keys.
On your SecureBoot (https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/SecureBoot) it is outlined that GRUB will boot unsigned kernels when the kernel is unsigned. During one of our experiments it seemed that this statement was true and that GRUB loads unsigned kernels as described on your page. We understand that for various reasons GRUB should still support the use-case when an unsigned kernel must be loaded, but with the current approach the user isn't aware if there is a whole chain of trust. For example, it could still be possible to load some malware before it boots the Operating System itself (bootkits). One of the many reasons that Secure Boot has been developed is to protect the user from these kind of attacks.
With the current approach the purpose of Secure Boot is somewhat defeated, and the user doesn't know if the whole chain has been verified or not. It could easily be the case that an unsigned kernel has been loaded by Ubuntu without the user noticing. From our point of view, a better approach would be to inform the user that an unsigned kernel will be loaded and that the user can make a choice if he/she wants to proceed. The default action could be to accept the option, remember the user's option and sometimes remind the user of the fact that it is loading an unsigned kernel.
This problem is of course related to GRUB itself and not to Ubuntu itself. The reason for filing this bug and informing the SecurityTeam of Ubuntu is to ask for their opinions and what your point of view is on the current approach and to see if other users classify this as a "bug".
GRUB2 versions: grub-2.02~beta2, 1.34.1+2.02~beta2-9ubuntu1
Ubuntu version: Trusty (will also affect newer and older versions, GRUB specific problem) |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:06:55 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2-signed (Ubuntu) |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:01 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu): status |
New |
Triaged |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:04 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu): importance |
Undecided |
High |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:08 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu): assignee |
|
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre (cyphermox) |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
nominated for series |
|
Ubuntu Xenial |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2 (Ubuntu Xenial) |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Xenial) |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
nominated for series |
|
Ubuntu Trusty |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2 (Ubuntu Trusty) |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Trusty) |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
nominated for series |
|
Ubuntu Zesty |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2 (Ubuntu Zesty) |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Zesty) |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
nominated for series |
|
Ubuntu Yakkety |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2 (Ubuntu Yakkety) |
|
| 2017-03-30 20:07:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Yakkety) |
|
| 2017-03-31 04:22:33 |
Robert Liu |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Robert Liu |
| 2017-04-04 09:58:01 |
Adam Heczko |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Adam Heczko |
| 2017-04-08 01:48:31 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2 (Ubuntu Zesty): status |
Triaged |
Fix Released |
|
| 2017-04-08 01:49:16 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Zesty): status |
Triaged |
Fix Released |
|
| 2017-04-11 00:37:12 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Zesty): status |
Fix Released |
Triaged |
|
| 2017-04-11 00:37:25 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Zesty): status |
Fix Released |
Triaged |
|
| 2017-04-29 16:08:56 |
Chris Mayo |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Chris Mayo |
| 2017-05-18 01:59:37 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2 (Ubuntu Trusty): status |
New |
Confirmed |
|
| 2017-05-18 01:59:37 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Trusty): status |
New |
Confirmed |
|
| 2017-05-18 01:59:37 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2 (Ubuntu Xenial): status |
New |
Confirmed |
|
| 2017-05-18 01:59:37 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Xenial): status |
New |
Confirmed |
|
| 2017-05-18 01:59:37 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2 (Ubuntu Yakkety): status |
New |
Confirmed |
|
| 2017-05-18 01:59:37 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Yakkety): status |
New |
Confirmed |
|
| 2017-05-18 02:00:14 |
Reuben Lifshay |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Reuben Lifshay |
| 2017-11-14 04:14:03 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2 (Ubuntu): status |
Triaged |
Fix Released |
|
| 2017-11-14 19:53:15 |
Victor Perevertkin |
removed subscriber Victor Perevertkin |
|
|
|
| 2018-09-05 21:02:51 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task deleted |
grub2 (Ubuntu Zesty) |
|
|
| 2018-09-05 21:02:58 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task deleted |
grub2 (Ubuntu Yakkety) |
|
|
| 2018-09-05 21:03:05 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task deleted |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Yakkety) |
|
|
| 2018-09-05 21:03:10 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task deleted |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Zesty) |
|
|
| 2018-09-05 21:03:20 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
nominated for series |
|
Ubuntu Bionic |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:03:20 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2 (Ubuntu Bionic) |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:03:20 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
bug task added |
|
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Bionic) |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:03:30 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Bionic): status |
New |
In Progress |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:03:35 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Bionic): status |
New |
In Progress |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:06 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Bionic): assignee |
|
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre (cyphermox) |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:09 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Bionic): assignee |
|
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre (cyphermox) |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:15 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Xenial): status |
Confirmed |
Triaged |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:18 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Trusty): status |
Confirmed |
Triaged |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:22 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Trusty): status |
Confirmed |
Triaged |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:27 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu): status |
Triaged |
Fix Released |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:31 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Xenial): status |
Confirmed |
Triaged |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:35 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Bionic): importance |
Undecided |
High |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:37 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Xenial): importance |
Undecided |
High |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:39 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Trusty): importance |
Undecided |
High |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:41 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Bionic): importance |
Undecided |
High |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:43 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Xenial): importance |
Undecided |
High |
|
| 2018-09-05 21:04:45 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Trusty): importance |
Undecided |
High |
|
| 2018-09-18 09:16:56 |
Paddy Landau |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Paddy Landau |
| 2019-01-02 13:03:29 |
Tom Reynolds |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Tom Reynolds |
| 2019-02-07 20:09:45 |
Steve Langasek |
grub2 (Ubuntu Bionic): status |
In Progress |
Fix Committed |
|
| 2019-02-07 20:09:49 |
Steve Langasek |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Ubuntu Stable Release Updates Team |
| 2019-02-07 20:09:53 |
Steve Langasek |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber SRU Verification |
| 2019-02-07 20:10:07 |
Steve Langasek |
tags |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot xenial |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-needed verification-needed-bionic xenial |
|
| 2019-02-07 20:20:43 |
Steve Langasek |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Bionic): status |
In Progress |
Fix Committed |
|
| 2019-02-08 16:01:24 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
tags |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-needed verification-needed-bionic xenial |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-needed xenial |
|
| 2019-02-08 16:01:33 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
tags |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-needed xenial |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic xenial |
|
| 2019-02-08 19:13:18 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2 (Ubuntu Bionic): status |
Fix Committed |
Fix Released |
|
| 2019-02-08 19:13:29 |
Steve Langasek |
removed subscriber Ubuntu Stable Release Updates Team |
|
|
|
| 2019-02-08 19:13:41 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Bionic): status |
Fix Committed |
Fix Released |
|
| 2019-03-15 10:08:18 |
semreh |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber semreh |
| 2019-03-22 14:48:23 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Trusty): status |
Triaged |
In Progress |
|
| 2019-03-22 14:48:27 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Trusty): status |
Triaged |
In Progress |
|
| 2019-03-22 14:48:29 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Trusty): assignee |
|
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre (cyphermox) |
|
| 2019-03-22 14:48:33 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Trusty): assignee |
|
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre (cyphermox) |
|
| 2019-03-22 14:48:35 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Xenial): assignee |
|
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre (cyphermox) |
|
| 2019-03-22 14:48:37 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Xenial): assignee |
|
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre (cyphermox) |
|
| 2019-03-22 14:48:40 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2 (Ubuntu Xenial): status |
Triaged |
In Progress |
|
| 2019-03-22 14:48:44 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Xenial): status |
Triaged |
In Progress |
|
| 2019-03-22 19:40:10 |
Steve Langasek |
grub2 (Ubuntu Trusty): status |
In Progress |
Fix Committed |
|
| 2019-03-22 19:40:15 |
Steve Langasek |
bug |
|
|
added subscriber Ubuntu Stable Release Updates Team |
| 2019-03-22 19:40:33 |
Steve Langasek |
tags |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic xenial |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-needed verification-needed-trusty xenial |
|
| 2019-03-22 20:09:48 |
Steve Langasek |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Trusty): status |
In Progress |
Fix Committed |
|
| 2019-04-01 15:56:06 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
tags |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-needed verification-needed-trusty xenial |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-done-trusty verification-needed xenial |
|
| 2019-04-01 16:04:32 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
tags |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-done-trusty verification-needed xenial |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-failed-trusty verification-needed xenial |
|
| 2019-04-01 16:13:24 |
Steve Langasek |
tags |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-failed-trusty verification-needed xenial |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-needed verification-needed-trusty xenial |
|
| 2019-04-01 21:17:13 |
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre |
tags |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-needed verification-needed-trusty xenial |
grub2 grub2-signed secureboot verification-done-bionic verification-done-trusty xenial |
|
| 2019-04-09 19:37:06 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2 (Ubuntu Trusty): status |
Fix Committed |
Fix Released |
|
| 2019-04-09 19:37:14 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Trusty): status |
Fix Committed |
Fix Released |
|
| 2020-07-29 17:54:52 |
Launchpad Janitor |
grub2 (Ubuntu Xenial): status |
In Progress |
Fix Released |
|
| 2020-07-29 17:54:52 |
Launchpad Janitor |
cve linked |
|
2020-10713 |
|
| 2020-07-29 17:54:52 |
Launchpad Janitor |
cve linked |
|
2020-14308 |
|
| 2020-07-29 17:54:52 |
Launchpad Janitor |
cve linked |
|
2020-14309 |
|
| 2020-07-29 17:54:52 |
Launchpad Janitor |
cve linked |
|
2020-14310 |
|
| 2020-07-29 17:54:52 |
Launchpad Janitor |
cve linked |
|
2020-14311 |
|
| 2020-07-29 17:54:52 |
Launchpad Janitor |
cve linked |
|
2020-15705 |
|
| 2020-07-29 17:54:52 |
Launchpad Janitor |
cve linked |
|
2020-15706 |
|
| 2020-07-29 17:54:52 |
Launchpad Janitor |
cve linked |
|
2020-15707 |
|
| 2020-08-04 19:54:02 |
Marcelo Cerri |
grub2-signed (Ubuntu Xenial): status |
In Progress |
Fix Released |
|
| 2020-08-05 13:07:31 |
Chen-Han Hsiao (Stanley) |
removed subscriber Chen-Han Hsiao (Stanley) |
|
|
|
