Review for Package: python-autocommand

[Summary]
This is the typical small python lib, that is well packaged and tested given
its size and scope. There is a bit of uncertainty as it is rather new, but
the openstack team has experience in maintaining those. If - in the future - it
isn't maintained in Debian I'm convinced they will just do fine themself.

MIR team ACK

This does IMHO not need a security review

List of specific binary packages to be promoted to main: python3-autocommand
Specific binary packages built, but NOT to be promoted to main: none

[Duplication]
The only similar function I'Ve found is in python3-argh and that is also
in universe. Therefore there is no other package in main providing the same
functionality.

[Dependencies]
OK:
- no other Dependencies to MIR due to this
- no -dev/-debug/-doc packages that need exclusion
- No dependencies in main that are only superficially tested requiring
  more tests now.

Problems: None

[Embedded sources and static linking]
OK:
- no embedded source present
- no static linking
- does not have unexpected Built-Using entries
- not a go package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- not a rust package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard

Problems: None

[Security]
RULE: - Determine if the package may have security implications or history.
RULE:   Err on the side of caution.
RULE: - If the package is security sensitive, you should review as much as you
RULE:   can and then assign to the ubuntu-security team. The bug will then be
RULE:   added to the prioritized list of MIR security reviews.

OK:
- history of CVEs does not look concerning
- does not run a daemon as root
- does not use webkit1,2
- does not use lib*v8 directly
- does not parse data formats (files [images, video, audio,
  xml, json, asn.1], network packets, structures, ...) from
  an untrusted source.
  Essentially it only parses the code it is imported in, if you have access
  to the code then there is no need to exploit this library anymore.
- does not open a port/socket
- does not process arbitrary web content
- does not use centralized online accounts
- does not integrate arbitrary javascript into the desktop
- does not deal with system authentication (eg, pam), etc)
- does not deal with security attestation (secure boot, tpm, signatures)
- does not deal with cryptography (en-/decryption, certificates, signing, ...)

Problems: None

[Common blockers]
OK:
- does not FTBFS currently
- does have a test suite that runs at build time
  - test suite fails will fail the build upon error.
    it runs pytest against all enabled python versions
- does have a non-trivial test suite that runs as autopkgtest
  runs the upstream test in autopkgtest context
- This does not need special HW for build or test
- no new python2 dependency
- Python package, but using dh_python

Problems: None

[Packaging red flags]
OK:
- Ubuntu does not carry a delta
- symbols tracking not applicable for this kind of code.
- d/watch is present and looks ok
- Upstream update history is good
- the current release is packaged
- promoting this does not seem to cause issues for MOTUs that so far
  maintained the package (as I said it is new and so far only maintained in Debian)
- no massive Lintian warnings
- d/rules is rather clean
- It is not on the lto-disabled list

Problems:
- Debian/Ubuntu update history is unknown as it was just recently added
  That is not a show-stopper

[Upstream red flags]
OK:
- no Errors/warnings during the build
- no incautious use of malloc/sprintf (the language has no direct MM)
- no use of sudo, gksu, pkexec, or LD_LIBRARY_PATH (usage is OK inside
  tests)
- no use of user nobody
- no use of setuid
- use of setuid, but ok because TBD (prefer systemd to set those
  for services)
- no important open bugs (crashers, etc) in Debian or Ubuntu
- no dependency on webkit, qtwebkit, seed or libgoa-*
- not part of the UI for extra checks
- no translation present, but none needed for this case

Problems: None