This bug was fixed in the package openssh - 1:9.6p1-3ubuntu1 --------------- openssh (1:9.6p1-3ubuntu1) noble; urgency=medium * Merge with Debian unstable (LP: #2040406). Remaining changes: - debian/rules: modify dh_installsystemd invocations for socket-activated sshd. - debian/openssh-server.postinst: handle migration of sshd_config options to systemd socket options on upgrade. - debian/README.Debian: document systemd socket activation. - debian/patches/socket-activation-documentation.patch: Document in sshd_config(5) that ListenAddress and Port no longer work. - debian/openssh-server.templates: include debconf prompt explaining when migration cannot happen due to multiple ListenAddress values. - debian/.gitignore: drop file. - debian/openssh-server.postrm: remove systemd drop-ins for socket-activated sshd on purge. - debian/openssh-server.ucf-md5sum: update for Ubuntu delta - debian/openssh-server.tmpfile,debian/systemd/ssh.service: Move /run/sshd creation out of the systemd unit to a tmpfile config so that sshd can be run manually if necessary without having to create this directory by hand. - debian/patches/systemd-socket-activation.patch: Fix sshd re-execution behavior when socket activation is used. - debian/tests/systemd-socket-activation: Add autopkgtest for systemd socket activation functionality. - d/p/test-set-UsePAM-no-on-some-tests.patch: set UsePAM=no for some tests. * Dropped changes, fixed upstream: - d/p/fix-ftbfs-with-zlib13.patch: fix ftbfs when using zlib 1.3 (LP #2049552) openssh (1:9.6p1-3) unstable; urgency=medium * Allow passing extra ssh-agent arguments via "/usr/lib/openssh/agent-launch start", making it possible to override things like identity lifetime using a systemd drop-in unit (closes: #1059639). * Don't try to start rescue-ssh.target in postinst (LP: #2047082). openssh (1:9.6p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium * Improve detection of broken -fzero-call-used-regs=used (see https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3645; fixes build on ppc64/ppc64el). openssh (1:9.6p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium * Use single quotes in suggested ssh-keygen commands (closes: #1057835). * Debconf translations: - Catalan (thanks, Pablo Huguet; closes: #1049995). * New upstream release (https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#9.6p1): - [CVE-2023-48795] ssh(1), sshd(8): implement protocol extensions to thwart the so-called "Terrapin attack" discovered by Fabian Bäumer, Marcus Brinkmann and Jörg Schwenk. This attack allows a MITM to effect a limited break of the integrity of the early encrypted SSH transport protocol by sending extra messages prior to the commencement of encryption, and deleting an equal number of consecutive messages immediately after encryption starts. A peer SSH client/server would not be able to detect that messages were deleted. - [CVE-2023-51384] ssh-agent(1): when adding PKCS#11-hosted private keys while specifying destination constraints, if the PKCS#11 token returned multiple keys then only the first key had the constraints applied. Use of regular private keys, FIDO tokens and unconstrained keys are unaffected. - [CVE-2023-51385] ssh(1): if an invalid user or hostname that contained shell metacharacters was passed to ssh(1), and a ProxyCommand, LocalCommand directive or "match exec" predicate referenced the user or hostname via %u, %h or similar expansion token, then an attacker who could supply arbitrary user/hostnames to ssh(1) could potentially perform command injection depending on what quoting was present in the user-supplied ssh_config(5) directive. OpenSSH 9.6 now bans most shell metacharacters from user and hostnames supplied via the command-line. - ssh(1), sshd(8): the RFC4254 connection/channels protocol provides a TCP-like window mechanism that limits the amount of data that can be sent without acceptance from the peer. In cases where this limit was exceeded by a non-conforming peer SSH implementation, ssh(1)/sshd(8) previously discarded the extra data. From OpenSSH 9.6, ssh(1)/sshd(8) will now terminate the connection if a peer exceeds the window limit by more than a small grace factor. This change should have no effect of SSH implementations that follow the specification. - ssh(1): add a %j token that expands to the configured ProxyJump hostname (or the empty string if this option is not being used) that can be used in a number of ssh_config(5) keywords. - ssh(1): add ChannelTimeout support to the client, mirroring the same option in the server and allowing ssh(1) to terminate quiescent channels. - ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1): add support for reading ED25519 private keys in PEM PKCS8 format. Previously only the OpenSSH private key format was supported. - ssh(1), sshd(8): introduce a protocol extension to allow renegotiation of acceptable signature algorithms for public key authentication after the server has learned the username being used for authentication. This allows varying sshd_config(5) PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms in a "Match user" block. - ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1): add an agent protocol extension to allow specifying certificates when loading PKCS#11 keys. This allows the use of certificates backed by PKCS#11 private keys in all OpenSSH tools that support ssh-agent(1). Previously only ssh(1) supported this use-case. - ssh(1): when deciding whether to enable the keystroke timing obfuscation, enable it only if a channel with a TTY is active. - ssh(1): switch mainloop from poll(3) to ppoll(3) and mask signals before checking flags set in signal handler. Avoids potential race condition between signaling ssh to exit and polling. - ssh(1): when connecting to a destination with both the AddressFamily and CanonicalizeHostname directives in use, the AddressFamily directive could be ignored. - sftp(1): correct handling of the