Review for Package: nullboot [Summary] nullboot is a boot manager for environments that do not need a boot manager. Instead of running a boot manager at boot, it directly manages the UEFI boot entries for you. It produces a Go binary that measures boot binaries and does some sealing, to allow automatic full disk encryption. It only operates on trusted data (firmware data and kernels in /usr/lib/linux/efi). MIR team ACK This does need a security review, so I'll assign ubuntu-security (package deals with security attestation) List of specific binary packages to be promoted to main: nullboot_0.3.0-0ubuntu1_amd64 Notes: Recommended TODOs: 1. It would be nice to have a test plan for end-to-end testing. - The package should get a team bug subscriber before being promoted [Duplication] - There is no other package in main providing the same functionality. [Dependencies] OK: - no other Dependencies to MIR due to this - checked with check-mir - not listed in seeded-in-ubuntu - none of the (potentially auto-generated) dependencies (Depends and Recommends) that are present after build are not in main - no -dev/-debug/-doc packages that need exclusion - No dependencies in main that are only superficially tested requiring more tests now. Problems: None [Embedded sources and static linking] OK: - does not have odd Built-Using entries - Go Package that follows the Debian Go packaging guidelines - vendoring is used, but the reasoning is sufficiently explained - golang: static builds are used, the team confirmed their commitment to the additional responsibilities implied by static builds. Problems: None [Security] OK: - history of CVEs does not look concerning - does not run a daemon as root - does not use webkit1,2 - does not use lib*v8 directly - does not parse data formats - does not open a port/socket - does not process arbitrary web content - does not use centralized online accounts - does not integrate arbitrary javascript into the desktop - does not deal with system authentication (eg, pam), etc) Problems: - does deal with security attestation (secure boot, tpm, signatures) [Common blockers] OK: - does not FTBFS currently - does have a test suite that runs at build time - test suite fails will fail the build upon error. - does have a non-trivial test suite that runs as autopkgtest - no new python2 dependency - Go package, but using dh-golang Problems: None [Packaging red flags] OK: - Ubuntu does not carry a delta - symbols tracking not applicable for this kind of code. - d/watch is present and looks ok (if needed, e.g. non-native) - Upstream update history is good - Debian/Ubuntu update history is good - the current release is packaged - promoting this does not seem to cause issues for MOTUs that so far maintained the package - no massive Lintian warnings - d/rules is rather clean - It is not on the lto-disabled list Problems: None [Upstream red flags] OK: - no Errors/warnings during the build - no incautious use of malloc/sprintf (as far as we can check it) - no use of sudo, gksu, pkexec, or LD_LIBRARY_PATH (usage is OK inside tests) - no use of user nobody - no use of setuid - no important open bugs (crashers, etc) in Debian or Ubuntu - no dependency on webkit, qtwebkit, seed or libgoa-* - not part of the UI for extra checks - no translation present, but none needed for this case (user visible)? Problems: None