Activity log for bug #116803

Date Who What changed Old value New value Message
2007-05-25 10:28:24 David Given bug added bug
2007-05-25 22:55:22 Kees Cook linux-meta: status Unconfirmed Confirmed
2007-05-25 22:55:22 Kees Cook linux-meta: importance Undecided Low
2007-05-25 22:55:22 Kees Cook linux-meta: statusexplanation Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu better. I have unmarked it as a security issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to cross privilege boundaries nor directly cause loss of data/privacy. While this is an ugly bug, it can't be used to make world-writable directories less secure. Resource DoS's in temporary file areas is already possible if an attacker knows the filename being opened (which is why using mkstemp() is so important). For a hash colllision, this requirement is still true. Hitting this bug is like having another user fill up the entire /tmp partition: a user is suddenly unable to make temp files. Please feel free to report any other bugs you may find.
2009-06-02 19:37:21 Andy Whitcroft affects linux-meta (Ubuntu) linux (Ubuntu)
2018-01-03 15:11:05 dino99 linux (Ubuntu): status Confirmed Invalid