[Summary]
MIR team Ack, a very small and clean python lib.
But this one has a few todos we need to resolve before/after promotion:

TODO ASAP:
- For 20.04 we really should consider going ahead to the much newer 1.5.2
  => https://github.com/maxmind/MaxMind-DB-Reader-python/releases
  @andreas will you take a look at this, just as you did with the other
  related package that was slightly outdated?
- ask Josh to subscribe server-team to this pkg as well

TODO long-term:
- I'd wonder if we can get a security review (on all of these) in the long
  run but not gating the MIR for now - details below?
- Debian updates a bit slowly, we might need to do the monitoring and
  updating on this one - @Andreas is that ok for you to do that
  along e.g. bind9 merges?

[Duplication]
While python3-geoip2 was for the API this package python-maxminddb is a
python interface for reading the MaxMind DB. I don't see a package in
main doing that already. No duplication issue.

[Dependencies]
OK:
- no other Dependencies to MIR due to this
- no -dev/-debug/-doc packages that need exclusion
  - doc depends only on libjs-sphinxdoc which is in main already

[Embedded sources and static linking]
OK:
- no embedded source present
- no static linking

[Security]
OK:
- history of CVEs does not look concerning
- does not run a daemon as root
- does not use webkit1,2
- does not use lib*v8 directly
- does not open a port
- does not process arbitrary web content
- does not use centralized online accounts
- does not integrate arbitrary javascript into the desktop
- does not deal with system authentication (eg, pam), etc)

- does parse data formats
  There are two ways it can operate. It can either do the processing in its
  python code or has a C extension - but that extension only is a shim to pass
  to the libmaxminddb0 code.
  That way - as with the other packages in this context it does fairly minimal
  things and has despite its age no CVE history at all.

I have revisited the parsing in all the packages int his MIR, I still think
it is fairly minimal and does not need a "gating security review".
But on the long run - once the 20.04 dust settles - it might be good to have
one eventually. @Andreas could you after resolving this ask security if they
could do an informal security review on the packages in this MIR?

[Common blockers]
OK:
- does not FTBFS currently
- does have a test suite that runs at build time
  - test suite fails will fail the build upon error.
  seem good enough for this package
- The package has a team bug subscriber
- no translation present, but none needed for this case (user visible)?
- not a python package, no extra constraints to consider int hat regard
- no new python2 dependency
- Python package that is using dh_python

Problem:
- does not have a test suite that runs as autopkgtest, but the build time
  tests (171) seem enough for this Packages content

[Packaging red flags]
OK:
- Ubuntu does not carry a delta
- Ubuntu does carry a delta, but it is reasonable and maintenance under control
- symbols tracking not applicable for this kind of code.
- d/watch is present and looks ok
- Upstream update history is good
- Debian/Ubuntu update history is not too bad but is slightly outdated
  we might need to work on it along bind9 merges
- promoting this does not seem to cause issues for MOTUs that so far
  maintained the package
- no massive Lintian warnings
- d/rules is rather clean
- Does not have Built-Using

Problem:
- the current release is not packaged
  There is a 1.5.2 which outdates our 1.4.1 by 1.5years. This should be updates
  before we ship it in an LTS.

[Upstream red flags]
OK:
- no Errors/warnings during the build
- no incautious use of malloc/sprintf (mostly python)
- no use of sudo, gksu, pkexec, or LD_LIBRARY_PATH
- no use of user nobody
- no use of setuid
- no important open bugs (crashers, etc) in Debian or Ubuntu
- no dependency on webkit, qtwebkit, seed or libgoa-*
- no embedded source copies
- not part of the UI for extra checks

Assigning to Andreas for the version update (which will also need an FFe bug along)