Review for Source Package: libclass-inspector-perl

[Summary]
MIR team ACK. Do not forget to add the team subscription.
This does not need a security review
List of specific binary packages to be promoted to main: libclass-inspector-perl

Notes:
Required TODO:
- The package should get a team bug subscriber before being promoted

[Rationale, Duplication and Ownership]
There is no other package in main providing the same functionality after .
A team is committed to own long term maintenance of this package.
The rationale given in the report seems valid and useful for Ubuntu

[Dependencies]
- no other Dependencies to MIR due to this
- libregexp-common-perl checked with `check-mir`
- all dependencies can be found in `seeded-in-ubuntu` (already in main)
- none of the (potentially auto-generated) dependencies (Depends
 and Recommends) that are present after build are not in main
- no -dev/-debug/-doc packages that need exclusion
- No dependencies in main that are only superficially tested requiring
  more tests now.

[Embedded sources and static linking]
OK:
- no embedded source present
- no static linking
- does not have unexpected Built-Using entries

OK:
- not a go package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- not a rust package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- Does not include vendored code

[Security]
OK:
- history of CVEs does not look concerning
- does not run a daemon as root
- does not use webkit1,2
- does not use lib*v8 directly
- does not parse data formats (files [images, video, audio,
  xml, json, asn.1], network packets, structures, ...) from
  an untrusted source.
- does not expose any external endpoint (port/socket/... or similar)
- does not process arbitrary web content
- does not use centralized online accounts
- does not integrate arbitrary javascript into the desktop
- does not deal with system authentication (eg, pam), etc)
- does not deal with security attestation (secure boot, tpm, signatures)
- does not deal with cryptography (en-/decryption, certificates,
  signing, ...)
- this makes appropriate (for its exposure) use of established risk
  mitigation features (dropping permissions, using temporary environments,
  restricted users/groups, seccomp, systemd isolation features,
  apparmor, ...)

[Common blockers]
OK:
- does not FTBFS currently
- does have a test suite that runs at build time
- test suite fails will fail the build upon error.
- does have a non-trivial test suite that runs as autopkgtest
- This does not need special HW for build or test
- no new python2 dependency

Problems:
Note: the autopkgtests are failing on i386 as depends on pkg-perl-autopkgtest package that is not build for i386 since focal.

[Packaging red flags]
OK:
- Ubuntu does not carry a delta
- symbols tracking not applicable for this kind of code.
- debian/watch is present and looks ok
- Upstream update history is good
- Debian/Ubuntu update history is good
- the current release is packaged
- promoting this does not seem to cause issues for MOTUs that so far
- no massive Lintian warnings
- debian/rules is rather clean
- It is not on the lto-disabled list

[Upstream red flags]
OK:
- no Errors/warnings during the build
- no incautious use of malloc/sprintf (as far as we can check it)
- no use of sudo, gksu, pkexec, or LD_LIBRARY_PATH (usage is OK inside
  tests)
- no use of user nobody
- no use of setuid / setgid
- use of setuid, but ok because TBD (prefer systemd to set those
  for services)
- no important open bugs (crashers, etc) in Debian or Ubuntu
- no dependency on webkit, qtwebkit, seed or libgoa-*
- not part of the UI for extra checks
- no translation present, but none needed for this case