Activity log for bug #2004555

Date Who What changed Old value New value Message
2023-02-02 11:28:50 Jan Wasilewski bug added bug
2023-02-02 11:58:47 Jan Wasilewski bug added subscriber Lukasz
2023-02-02 14:20:26 Jeremy Stanley description Hello OpenStack Security Team, I’m writing to you, as we faced a serious security breach in OpenStack functionality(correlated a bit with libvirt, iscsi and huawei driver). I was going through OSSA documents and correlated libvirt notes, but I couldn't find something similar. It is not related to https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2020-006.html In short: we observed that newly created cinder volume(1GB size) was attached to compute node instance, but an instance recognized it as a 115GB volume, which(this 115GB volume) in fact was connected to another instance on the same compute node. [1. Test environment] Compute node: OpenStack Ussuri configured with Huawei dorado as a storage backend(configuration driver is available here: https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/rocky/configuration/block-storage/drivers/huawei-storage-driver.html) Packages: v# dpkg -l | grep libvirt ii libvirt-clients 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Programs for the libvirt library ii libvirt-daemon 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii libvirt-daemon-driver-storage-rbd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon RBD storage driver ii libvirt-daemon-system 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files ii libvirt-daemon-system-systemd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files (systemd) ii libvirt0:amd64 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 library for interfacing with different virtualization systems ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-libvirt 6.1.0-1 amd64 libvirt Python 3 bindings # dpkg -l | grep qemu ii ipxe-qemu 1.0.0+git-20190109.133f4c4-0ubuntu3.2 all PXE boot firmware - ROM images for qemu ii ipxe-qemu-256k-compat-efi-roms 1.0.0+git-20150424.a25a16d-0ubuntu4 all PXE boot firmware - Compat EFI ROM images for qemu ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii qemu 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 fast processor emulator, dummy package ii qemu-block-extra:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 extra block backend modules for qemu-system and qemu-utils ii qemu-kvm 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU Full virtualization on x86 hardware ii qemu-system-common 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (common files) ii qemu-system-data 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 all QEMU full system emulation (data files) ii qemu-system-gui:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (user interface and audio support) ii qemu-system-x86 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (x86) ii qemu-utils 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU utilities # dpkg -l | grep nova ii nova-common 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - common files ii nova-compute 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node base ii nova-compute-kvm 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node (KVM) ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-nova 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute Python 3 libraries ii python3-novaclient 2:17.0.0-0ubuntu1 all client library for OpenStack Compute API - 3.x # dpkg -l | grep multipath ii multipath-tools 0.8.3-1ubuntu2 amd64 maintain multipath block device access # dpkg -l | grep iscsi ii libiscsi7:amd64 1.18.0-2 amd64 iSCSI client shared library ii open-iscsi 2.0.874-7.1ubuntu6.2 amd64 iSCSI initiator tools # cat /etc/lsb-release DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu DISTRIB_RELEASE=20.04 DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS" Instance OS: Debian-11-amd64 [2. Test scenario] Already created instance with two volumes attached. First - 10GB for root system, second - 115GB used as vdb. Recognized by compute node as vda - dm-11, vdb - dm-9: # virsh domblklist 90fas439-fc0e-4e22-8d0b-6f2a18eee5c1 Target Source ---------------------- vda /dev/dm-11 vdb /dev/dm-9 # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6acaa2900002f6a dm-11 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=10G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active |- 14:0:0:3 sdq 65:0 active ready running |- 15:0:0:3 sdr 65:16 active ready running |- 16:0:0:3 sdp 8:240 active ready running `- 17:0:0:3 sds 65:32 active ready running Creating a new instance, with the same OS guest system and 10GB root volume. After successful deployment, creating a new volume(1GB) size and attaching it to newly created instance. We can see after that: # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active |- 14:0:0:10 sdao 66:128 failed faulty running |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running |- 15:0:0:10 sdap 66:144 failed faulty running |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running |- 16:0:0:10 sdan 66:112 failed faulty running |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running |- 17:0:0:10 sdaq 66:160 failed faulty running `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running This way at instance we were able to see a new drive - not 1GB, but 115GB -> so it seems it was incorrectly attached and this way we were able to destroy some data on that volume. Additionaly we were able to see many errors like that in compute node logs: # dmesg -T | grep dm-9 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 62918760 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 2 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 33625152 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 6 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66663000 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66598120 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:51 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66638680 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 12 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66614344 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 1 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66469296 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 24 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66586472 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 3 prio class 0 (...) Unfortunately we do not know what is a perfect test-scenario for it as we could face such issue in less than 2% of our tries, but it looks like a serious security breach. Additionally we observed that linux kernel is not fully clearing a device allocation(from volume detach), so some of drives names are visible in an output, i.e. lsblk command. Then, after new volume attachment we can see such names(i.e. sdao, sdap, sdan and so on) are reusable by that drive and wrongly mapped by multipath/iscsi to another drive and this way we hit an issue. Our question is why linux kernel of compute node is not removing devices allocation and this way is leading to a scenario like that? Maybe this can be a solution here. Thanks in advance for your help and understanding. In case when more details is needed, do not hesitate to contact me. This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2023-05-03 and will be made public by or on that date even if no fix is identified. Hello OpenStack Security Team, I’m writing to you, as we faced a serious security breach in OpenStack functionality(correlated a bit with libvirt, iscsi and huawei driver). I was going through OSSA documents and correlated libvirt notes, but I couldn't find something similar. It is not related to https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2020-006.html In short: we observed that newly created cinder volume(1GB size) was attached to compute node instance, but an instance recognized it as a 115GB volume, which(this 115GB volume) in fact was connected to another instance on the same compute node. [1. Test environment] Compute node: OpenStack Ussuri configured with Huawei dorado as a storage backend(configuration driver is available here: https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/rocky/configuration/block-storage/drivers/huawei-storage-driver.html) Packages: v# dpkg -l | grep libvirt ii libvirt-clients 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Programs for the libvirt library ii libvirt-daemon 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii libvirt-daemon-driver-storage-rbd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon RBD storage driver ii libvirt-daemon-system 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files ii libvirt-daemon-system-systemd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files (systemd) ii libvirt0:amd64 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 library for interfacing with different virtualization systems ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-libvirt 6.1.0-1 amd64 libvirt Python 3 bindings # dpkg -l | grep qemu ii ipxe-qemu 1.0.0+git-20190109.133f4c4-0ubuntu3.2 all PXE boot firmware - ROM images for qemu ii ipxe-qemu-256k-compat-efi-roms 1.0.0+git-20150424.a25a16d-0ubuntu4 all PXE boot firmware - Compat EFI ROM images for qemu ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii qemu 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 fast processor emulator, dummy package ii qemu-block-extra:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 extra block backend modules for qemu-system and qemu-utils ii qemu-kvm 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU Full virtualization on x86 hardware ii qemu-system-common 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (common files) ii qemu-system-data 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 all QEMU full system emulation (data files) ii qemu-system-gui:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (user interface and audio support) ii qemu-system-x86 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (x86) ii qemu-utils 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU utilities # dpkg -l | grep nova ii nova-common 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - common files ii nova-compute 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node base ii nova-compute-kvm 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node (KVM) ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-nova 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute Python 3 libraries ii python3-novaclient 2:17.0.0-0ubuntu1 all client library for OpenStack Compute API - 3.x # dpkg -l | grep multipath ii multipath-tools 0.8.3-1ubuntu2 amd64 maintain multipath block device access # dpkg -l | grep iscsi ii libiscsi7:amd64 1.18.0-2 amd64 iSCSI client shared library ii open-iscsi 2.0.874-7.1ubuntu6.2 amd64 iSCSI initiator tools # cat /etc/lsb-release DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu DISTRIB_RELEASE=20.04 DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS" Instance OS: Debian-11-amd64 [2. Test scenario] Already created instance with two volumes attached. First - 10GB for root system, second - 115GB used as vdb. Recognized by compute node as vda - dm-11, vdb - dm-9: # virsh domblklist 90fas439-fc0e-4e22-8d0b-6f2a18eee5c1  Target Source ----------------------  vda /dev/dm-11  vdb /dev/dm-9 # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running   `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6acaa2900002f6a dm-11 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=10G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:3 sdq 65:0 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:3 sdr 65:16 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:3 sdp 8:240 active ready running   `- 17:0:0:3 sds 65:32 active ready running Creating a new instance, with the same OS guest system and 10GB root volume. After successful deployment, creating a new volume(1GB) size and attaching it to newly created instance. We can see after that: # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:10 sdao 66:128 failed faulty running   |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:10 sdap 66:144 failed faulty running   |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:10 sdan 66:112 failed faulty running   |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running   |- 17:0:0:10 sdaq 66:160 failed faulty running   `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running This way at instance we were able to see a new drive - not 1GB, but 115GB -> so it seems it was incorrectly attached and this way we were able to destroy some data on that volume. Additionaly we were able to see many errors like that in compute node logs: # dmesg -T | grep dm-9 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 62918760 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 2 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 33625152 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 6 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66663000 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66598120 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:51 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66638680 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 12 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66614344 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 1 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66469296 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 24 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66586472 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 3 prio class 0 (...) Unfortunately we do not know what is a perfect test-scenario for it as we could face such issue in less than 2% of our tries, but it looks like a serious security breach. Additionally we observed that linux kernel is not fully clearing a device allocation(from volume detach), so some of drives names are visible in an output, i.e. lsblk command. Then, after new volume attachment we can see such names(i.e. sdao, sdap, sdan and so on) are reusable by that drive and wrongly mapped by multipath/iscsi to another drive and this way we hit an issue. Our question is why linux kernel of compute node is not removing devices allocation and this way is leading to a scenario like that? Maybe this can be a solution here. Thanks in advance for your help and understanding. In case when more details is needed, do not hesitate to contact me.
2023-02-02 14:20:36 Jeremy Stanley bug task added ossa
2023-02-02 14:20:43 Jeremy Stanley ossa: status New Incomplete
2023-02-02 14:20:58 Jeremy Stanley bug added subscriber Nova Core security contacts
2023-02-02 15:21:07 Sylvain Bauza bug added subscriber melanie witt
2023-02-02 15:38:31 Sylvain Bauza nova: status New Incomplete
2023-02-02 16:15:31 Jan Wasilewski nova: status Incomplete New
2023-02-02 16:16:02 Jeremy Stanley bug task added cinder
2023-02-02 16:16:16 Jeremy Stanley bug added subscriber Cinder Core security contacts
2023-02-13 09:00:00 Jan Wasilewski bug added subscriber booliczek
2023-02-16 05:13:41 melanie witt attachment added nova-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5647561/+files/nova-2004555.patch
2023-02-16 11:09:55 Gorka Eguileor bug task added os-brick
2023-02-17 09:50:03 Gorka Eguileor attachment added Cinder fix https://bugs.launchpad.net/os-brick/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5648028/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-03-01 16:42:29 Gorka Eguileor attachment added os-brick FC force disconnect support https://bugs.launchpad.net/os-brick/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5650757/+files/osbrick-fc-2004555.patch
2023-03-01 16:57:17 Gorka Eguileor attachment added os-brick data leak prevention https://bugs.launchpad.net/os-brick/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5650759/+files/osbrick-leak-2004555.patch
2023-03-08 15:40:27 Gorka Eguileor bug added subscriber Anten Skrabec
2023-03-08 15:40:40 Gorka Eguileor bug added subscriber Avinash Hanwate
2023-03-08 15:40:50 Gorka Eguileor bug added subscriber Nick Tait
2023-03-17 21:08:24 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5655187/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-03-17 21:09:15 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed Cinder fix https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5648028/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-03-21 11:44:27 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5655187/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-03-21 12:00:06 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5656303/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-10 18:57:24 Brian Rosmaita bug added subscriber Alan Bishop
2023-04-13 20:17:26 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5656303/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-13 20:18:06 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5663732/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-14 08:28:50 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5663732/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-14 08:30:09 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5663933/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-14 14:32:59 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5663933/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-14 14:33:38 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5664044/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-14 22:47:49 Nick Tait cve linked 2023-2088
2023-04-18 12:20:33 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5664044/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-18 12:21:06 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5664986/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-18 13:01:30 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5664986/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-18 13:01:58 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5664988/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-18 17:57:19 Brian Rosmaita bug task added glance-store
2023-04-18 18:44:15 Brian Rosmaita attachment added glance_store-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance-store/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665044/+files/glance_store-2004555.patch
2023-04-19 15:00:58 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed glance_store-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665044/+files/glance_store-2004555.patch
2023-04-19 15:01:48 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665262/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-19 15:09:49 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5664988/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-19 15:09:58 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665262/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-19 15:10:16 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665263/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-19 15:13:45 Brian Rosmaita attachment added glance_store-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance-store/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665264/+files/glance_store-2004555.patch
2023-04-19 17:25:41 Dan Smith bug added subscriber Ghanshyam Mann
2023-04-20 02:49:28 melanie witt attachment added nova-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665336/+files/nova-2004555.patch
2023-04-20 02:49:51 melanie witt attachment removed nova-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5647561/+files/nova-2004555.patch
2023-04-20 19:55:57 Gorka Eguileor attachment added tempest-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665897/+files/tempest-2004555.patch
2023-04-20 20:00:43 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665263/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-20 20:02:34 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665898/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-21 01:05:23 melanie witt attachment added nova-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665961/+files/nova-2004555.patch
2023-04-21 01:06:05 melanie witt attachment removed nova-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665336/+files/nova-2004555.patch
2023-04-21 13:45:28 Dan Smith bug added subscriber Luigi Toscano
2023-04-21 19:16:12 melanie witt attachment added nova-2004555-xena.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5666527/+files/nova-2004555-xena.patch
2023-04-24 09:47:12 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed os-brick FC force disconnect support https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5650757/+files/osbrick-fc-2004555.patch
2023-04-24 09:47:21 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed os-brick data leak prevention https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5650759/+files/osbrick-leak-2004555.patch
2023-04-24 09:48:42 Gorka Eguileor attachment added osbrick-fc-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5667881/+files/osbrick-fc-2004555.patch
2023-04-24 09:49:03 Gorka Eguileor attachment added osbrick-leak-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5667882/+files/osbrick-leak-2004555.patch
2023-04-24 10:28:42 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5665898/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-24 10:29:27 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5667903/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-24 17:44:32 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed cinder-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5667903/+files/cinder-2004555.patch
2023-04-24 17:45:42 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555-master.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668187/+files/cinder-2004555-master.patch
2023-04-24 17:46:17 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555-2023.1_and_zed.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668188/+files/cinder-2004555-2023.1_and_zed.patch
2023-04-24 17:46:35 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555-yoga.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668189/+files/cinder-2004555-yoga.patch
2023-04-24 17:46:56 Gorka Eguileor attachment added cinder-2004555-xena.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668190/+files/cinder-2004555-xena.patch
2023-04-24 17:47:23 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed osbrick-fc-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5667881/+files/osbrick-fc-2004555.patch
2023-04-24 17:48:36 Gorka Eguileor attachment added osbrick-fc-2004555-master_to_zed.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668191/+files/osbrick-fc-2004555-master_to_zed.patch
2023-04-24 17:51:10 Gorka Eguileor attachment added osbrick-fc-2004555-yoga_and_xena.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668192/+files/osbrick-fc-2004555-yoga_and_xena.patch
2023-04-24 17:51:51 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed osbrick-fc-2004555-master_to_zed.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668191/+files/osbrick-fc-2004555-master_to_zed.patch
2023-04-24 17:52:53 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed osbrick-leak-2004555.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5667882/+files/osbrick-leak-2004555.patch
2023-04-24 17:53:13 Gorka Eguileor attachment added osbrick-fc-2004555-master_to_zed.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668211/+files/osbrick-fc-2004555-master_to_zed.patch
2023-04-24 17:53:33 Gorka Eguileor attachment added osbrick-leak-2004555-master.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668212/+files/osbrick-leak-2004555-master.patch
2023-04-25 11:58:07 Gorka Eguileor attachment added glance_store-2004555-zed.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668492/+files/glance_store-2004555-zed.patch
2023-04-25 11:58:45 Gorka Eguileor attachment added glance_store-2004555-yoga_and_xena.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668493/+files/glance_store-2004555-yoga_and_xena.patch
2023-04-25 18:57:24 Gorka Eguileor attachment removed osbrick-fc-2004555-master_to_zed.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668211/+files/osbrick-fc-2004555-master_to_zed.patch
2023-04-25 18:57:43 Gorka Eguileor attachment added osbrick-fc-2004555-master_to_zed.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5668644/+files/osbrick-fc-2004555-master_to_zed.patch
2023-04-27 18:42:01 melanie witt attachment added nova-2004555-xena_and_wallaby.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5669261/+files/nova-2004555-xena_and_wallaby.patch
2023-04-27 18:42:13 melanie witt attachment removed nova-2004555-xena.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/nova/+bug/2004555/+attachment/5666527/+files/nova-2004555-xena.patch
2023-04-27 18:47:00 melanie witt nominated for series nova/xena
2023-04-27 18:47:00 melanie witt bug task added nova/xena
2023-04-27 18:47:00 melanie witt nominated for series nova/zed
2023-04-27 18:47:00 melanie witt bug task added nova/zed
2023-04-27 18:47:00 melanie witt nominated for series nova/yoga
2023-04-27 18:47:00 melanie witt bug task added nova/yoga
2023-04-27 18:47:00 melanie witt nominated for series nova/antelope
2023-04-27 18:47:00 melanie witt bug task added nova/antelope
2023-05-02 02:16:19 Jeremy Stanley description This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2023-05-03 and will be made public by or on that date even if no fix is identified. Hello OpenStack Security Team, I’m writing to you, as we faced a serious security breach in OpenStack functionality(correlated a bit with libvirt, iscsi and huawei driver). I was going through OSSA documents and correlated libvirt notes, but I couldn't find something similar. It is not related to https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2020-006.html In short: we observed that newly created cinder volume(1GB size) was attached to compute node instance, but an instance recognized it as a 115GB volume, which(this 115GB volume) in fact was connected to another instance on the same compute node. [1. Test environment] Compute node: OpenStack Ussuri configured with Huawei dorado as a storage backend(configuration driver is available here: https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/rocky/configuration/block-storage/drivers/huawei-storage-driver.html) Packages: v# dpkg -l | grep libvirt ii libvirt-clients 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Programs for the libvirt library ii libvirt-daemon 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii libvirt-daemon-driver-storage-rbd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon RBD storage driver ii libvirt-daemon-system 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files ii libvirt-daemon-system-systemd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files (systemd) ii libvirt0:amd64 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 library for interfacing with different virtualization systems ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-libvirt 6.1.0-1 amd64 libvirt Python 3 bindings # dpkg -l | grep qemu ii ipxe-qemu 1.0.0+git-20190109.133f4c4-0ubuntu3.2 all PXE boot firmware - ROM images for qemu ii ipxe-qemu-256k-compat-efi-roms 1.0.0+git-20150424.a25a16d-0ubuntu4 all PXE boot firmware - Compat EFI ROM images for qemu ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii qemu 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 fast processor emulator, dummy package ii qemu-block-extra:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 extra block backend modules for qemu-system and qemu-utils ii qemu-kvm 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU Full virtualization on x86 hardware ii qemu-system-common 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (common files) ii qemu-system-data 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 all QEMU full system emulation (data files) ii qemu-system-gui:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (user interface and audio support) ii qemu-system-x86 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (x86) ii qemu-utils 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU utilities # dpkg -l | grep nova ii nova-common 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - common files ii nova-compute 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node base ii nova-compute-kvm 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node (KVM) ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-nova 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute Python 3 libraries ii python3-novaclient 2:17.0.0-0ubuntu1 all client library for OpenStack Compute API - 3.x # dpkg -l | grep multipath ii multipath-tools 0.8.3-1ubuntu2 amd64 maintain multipath block device access # dpkg -l | grep iscsi ii libiscsi7:amd64 1.18.0-2 amd64 iSCSI client shared library ii open-iscsi 2.0.874-7.1ubuntu6.2 amd64 iSCSI initiator tools # cat /etc/lsb-release DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu DISTRIB_RELEASE=20.04 DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS" Instance OS: Debian-11-amd64 [2. Test scenario] Already created instance with two volumes attached. First - 10GB for root system, second - 115GB used as vdb. Recognized by compute node as vda - dm-11, vdb - dm-9: # virsh domblklist 90fas439-fc0e-4e22-8d0b-6f2a18eee5c1  Target Source ----------------------  vda /dev/dm-11  vdb /dev/dm-9 # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running   `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6acaa2900002f6a dm-11 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=10G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:3 sdq 65:0 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:3 sdr 65:16 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:3 sdp 8:240 active ready running   `- 17:0:0:3 sds 65:32 active ready running Creating a new instance, with the same OS guest system and 10GB root volume. After successful deployment, creating a new volume(1GB) size and attaching it to newly created instance. We can see after that: # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:10 sdao 66:128 failed faulty running   |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:10 sdap 66:144 failed faulty running   |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:10 sdan 66:112 failed faulty running   |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running   |- 17:0:0:10 sdaq 66:160 failed faulty running   `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running This way at instance we were able to see a new drive - not 1GB, but 115GB -> so it seems it was incorrectly attached and this way we were able to destroy some data on that volume. Additionaly we were able to see many errors like that in compute node logs: # dmesg -T | grep dm-9 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 62918760 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 2 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 33625152 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 6 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66663000 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66598120 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:51 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66638680 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 12 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66614344 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 1 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66469296 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 24 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66586472 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 3 prio class 0 (...) Unfortunately we do not know what is a perfect test-scenario for it as we could face such issue in less than 2% of our tries, but it looks like a serious security breach. Additionally we observed that linux kernel is not fully clearing a device allocation(from volume detach), so some of drives names are visible in an output, i.e. lsblk command. Then, after new volume attachment we can see such names(i.e. sdao, sdap, sdan and so on) are reusable by that drive and wrongly mapped by multipath/iscsi to another drive and this way we hit an issue. Our question is why linux kernel of compute node is not removing devices allocation and this way is leading to a scenario like that? Maybe this can be a solution here. Thanks in advance for your help and understanding. In case when more details is needed, do not hesitate to contact me. This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2023-05-10 and will be made public by or on that date even if no fix is identified. Hello OpenStack Security Team, I’m writing to you, as we faced a serious security breach in OpenStack functionality(correlated a bit with libvirt, iscsi and huawei driver). I was going through OSSA documents and correlated libvirt notes, but I couldn't find something similar. It is not related to https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2020-006.html In short: we observed that newly created cinder volume(1GB size) was attached to compute node instance, but an instance recognized it as a 115GB volume, which(this 115GB volume) in fact was connected to another instance on the same compute node. [1. Test environment] Compute node: OpenStack Ussuri configured with Huawei dorado as a storage backend(configuration driver is available here: https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/rocky/configuration/block-storage/drivers/huawei-storage-driver.html) Packages: v# dpkg -l | grep libvirt ii libvirt-clients 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Programs for the libvirt library ii libvirt-daemon 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii libvirt-daemon-driver-storage-rbd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon RBD storage driver ii libvirt-daemon-system 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files ii libvirt-daemon-system-systemd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files (systemd) ii libvirt0:amd64 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 library for interfacing with different virtualization systems ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-libvirt 6.1.0-1 amd64 libvirt Python 3 bindings # dpkg -l | grep qemu ii ipxe-qemu 1.0.0+git-20190109.133f4c4-0ubuntu3.2 all PXE boot firmware - ROM images for qemu ii ipxe-qemu-256k-compat-efi-roms 1.0.0+git-20150424.a25a16d-0ubuntu4 all PXE boot firmware - Compat EFI ROM images for qemu ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii qemu 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 fast processor emulator, dummy package ii qemu-block-extra:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 extra block backend modules for qemu-system and qemu-utils ii qemu-kvm 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU Full virtualization on x86 hardware ii qemu-system-common 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (common files) ii qemu-system-data 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 all QEMU full system emulation (data files) ii qemu-system-gui:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (user interface and audio support) ii qemu-system-x86 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (x86) ii qemu-utils 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU utilities # dpkg -l | grep nova ii nova-common 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - common files ii nova-compute 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node base ii nova-compute-kvm 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node (KVM) ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-nova 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute Python 3 libraries ii python3-novaclient 2:17.0.0-0ubuntu1 all client library for OpenStack Compute API - 3.x # dpkg -l | grep multipath ii multipath-tools 0.8.3-1ubuntu2 amd64 maintain multipath block device access # dpkg -l | grep iscsi ii libiscsi7:amd64 1.18.0-2 amd64 iSCSI client shared library ii open-iscsi 2.0.874-7.1ubuntu6.2 amd64 iSCSI initiator tools # cat /etc/lsb-release DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu DISTRIB_RELEASE=20.04 DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS" Instance OS: Debian-11-amd64 [2. Test scenario] Already created instance with two volumes attached. First - 10GB for root system, second - 115GB used as vdb. Recognized by compute node as vda - dm-11, vdb - dm-9: # virsh domblklist 90fas439-fc0e-4e22-8d0b-6f2a18eee5c1  Target Source ----------------------  vda /dev/dm-11  vdb /dev/dm-9 # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running   `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6acaa2900002f6a dm-11 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=10G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:3 sdq 65:0 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:3 sdr 65:16 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:3 sdp 8:240 active ready running   `- 17:0:0:3 sds 65:32 active ready running Creating a new instance, with the same OS guest system and 10GB root volume. After successful deployment, creating a new volume(1GB) size and attaching it to newly created instance. We can see after that: # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:10 sdao 66:128 failed faulty running   |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:10 sdap 66:144 failed faulty running   |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:10 sdan 66:112 failed faulty running   |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running   |- 17:0:0:10 sdaq 66:160 failed faulty running   `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running This way at instance we were able to see a new drive - not 1GB, but 115GB -> so it seems it was incorrectly attached and this way we were able to destroy some data on that volume. Additionaly we were able to see many errors like that in compute node logs: # dmesg -T | grep dm-9 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 62918760 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 2 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 33625152 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 6 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66663000 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66598120 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:51 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66638680 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 12 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66614344 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 1 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66469296 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 24 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66586472 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 3 prio class 0 (...) Unfortunately we do not know what is a perfect test-scenario for it as we could face such issue in less than 2% of our tries, but it looks like a serious security breach. Additionally we observed that linux kernel is not fully clearing a device allocation(from volume detach), so some of drives names are visible in an output, i.e. lsblk command. Then, after new volume attachment we can see such names(i.e. sdao, sdap, sdan and so on) are reusable by that drive and wrongly mapped by multipath/iscsi to another drive and this way we hit an issue. Our question is why linux kernel of compute node is not removing devices allocation and this way is leading to a scenario like that? Maybe this can be a solution here. Thanks in advance for your help and understanding. In case when more details is needed, do not hesitate to contact me.
2023-05-02 02:18:15 Jeremy Stanley summary [ussuri] Wrong volume attachment - volumes overlapping when connected through iscsi on host Unauthorized volume access through deleted volume attachments (CVE-2023-2088)
2023-05-02 02:19:19 Jeremy Stanley ossa: status Incomplete In Progress
2023-05-02 02:19:25 Jeremy Stanley ossa: importance Undecided High
2023-05-02 02:19:33 Jeremy Stanley ossa: assignee Jeremy Stanley (fungi)
2023-05-02 19:14:19 Jeremy Stanley bug added subscriber Glance Core security contacts
2023-05-04 12:11:59 Jeremy Stanley bug added subscriber Kurt Garloff
2023-05-04 12:12:14 Jeremy Stanley bug added subscriber Felix Huettner
2023-05-09 08:25:38 Luigi Toscano bug added subscriber Evelina Shames
2023-05-10 00:17:00 melanie witt nominated for series nova/wallaby
2023-05-10 00:17:00 melanie witt bug task added nova/wallaby
2023-05-10 14:29:34 Jeremy Stanley description This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2023-05-10 and will be made public by or on that date even if no fix is identified. Hello OpenStack Security Team, I’m writing to you, as we faced a serious security breach in OpenStack functionality(correlated a bit with libvirt, iscsi and huawei driver). I was going through OSSA documents and correlated libvirt notes, but I couldn't find something similar. It is not related to https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2020-006.html In short: we observed that newly created cinder volume(1GB size) was attached to compute node instance, but an instance recognized it as a 115GB volume, which(this 115GB volume) in fact was connected to another instance on the same compute node. [1. Test environment] Compute node: OpenStack Ussuri configured with Huawei dorado as a storage backend(configuration driver is available here: https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/rocky/configuration/block-storage/drivers/huawei-storage-driver.html) Packages: v# dpkg -l | grep libvirt ii libvirt-clients 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Programs for the libvirt library ii libvirt-daemon 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii libvirt-daemon-driver-storage-rbd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon RBD storage driver ii libvirt-daemon-system 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files ii libvirt-daemon-system-systemd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files (systemd) ii libvirt0:amd64 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 library for interfacing with different virtualization systems ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-libvirt 6.1.0-1 amd64 libvirt Python 3 bindings # dpkg -l | grep qemu ii ipxe-qemu 1.0.0+git-20190109.133f4c4-0ubuntu3.2 all PXE boot firmware - ROM images for qemu ii ipxe-qemu-256k-compat-efi-roms 1.0.0+git-20150424.a25a16d-0ubuntu4 all PXE boot firmware - Compat EFI ROM images for qemu ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii qemu 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 fast processor emulator, dummy package ii qemu-block-extra:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 extra block backend modules for qemu-system and qemu-utils ii qemu-kvm 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU Full virtualization on x86 hardware ii qemu-system-common 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (common files) ii qemu-system-data 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 all QEMU full system emulation (data files) ii qemu-system-gui:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (user interface and audio support) ii qemu-system-x86 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (x86) ii qemu-utils 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU utilities # dpkg -l | grep nova ii nova-common 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - common files ii nova-compute 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node base ii nova-compute-kvm 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node (KVM) ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-nova 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute Python 3 libraries ii python3-novaclient 2:17.0.0-0ubuntu1 all client library for OpenStack Compute API - 3.x # dpkg -l | grep multipath ii multipath-tools 0.8.3-1ubuntu2 amd64 maintain multipath block device access # dpkg -l | grep iscsi ii libiscsi7:amd64 1.18.0-2 amd64 iSCSI client shared library ii open-iscsi 2.0.874-7.1ubuntu6.2 amd64 iSCSI initiator tools # cat /etc/lsb-release DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu DISTRIB_RELEASE=20.04 DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS" Instance OS: Debian-11-amd64 [2. Test scenario] Already created instance with two volumes attached. First - 10GB for root system, second - 115GB used as vdb. Recognized by compute node as vda - dm-11, vdb - dm-9: # virsh domblklist 90fas439-fc0e-4e22-8d0b-6f2a18eee5c1  Target Source ----------------------  vda /dev/dm-11  vdb /dev/dm-9 # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running   `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6acaa2900002f6a dm-11 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=10G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:3 sdq 65:0 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:3 sdr 65:16 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:3 sdp 8:240 active ready running   `- 17:0:0:3 sds 65:32 active ready running Creating a new instance, with the same OS guest system and 10GB root volume. After successful deployment, creating a new volume(1GB) size and attaching it to newly created instance. We can see after that: # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:10 sdao 66:128 failed faulty running   |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:10 sdap 66:144 failed faulty running   |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:10 sdan 66:112 failed faulty running   |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running   |- 17:0:0:10 sdaq 66:160 failed faulty running   `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running This way at instance we were able to see a new drive - not 1GB, but 115GB -> so it seems it was incorrectly attached and this way we were able to destroy some data on that volume. Additionaly we were able to see many errors like that in compute node logs: # dmesg -T | grep dm-9 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 62918760 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 2 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 33625152 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 6 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66663000 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66598120 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:51 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66638680 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 12 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66614344 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 1 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66469296 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 24 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66586472 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 3 prio class 0 (...) Unfortunately we do not know what is a perfect test-scenario for it as we could face such issue in less than 2% of our tries, but it looks like a serious security breach. Additionally we observed that linux kernel is not fully clearing a device allocation(from volume detach), so some of drives names are visible in an output, i.e. lsblk command. Then, after new volume attachment we can see such names(i.e. sdao, sdap, sdan and so on) are reusable by that drive and wrongly mapped by multipath/iscsi to another drive and this way we hit an issue. Our question is why linux kernel of compute node is not removing devices allocation and this way is leading to a scenario like that? Maybe this can be a solution here. Thanks in advance for your help and understanding. In case when more details is needed, do not hesitate to contact me. Hello OpenStack Security Team, I’m writing to you, as we faced a serious security breach in OpenStack functionality(correlated a bit with libvirt, iscsi and huawei driver). I was going through OSSA documents and correlated libvirt notes, but I couldn't find something similar. It is not related to https://security.openstack.org/ossa/OSSA-2020-006.html In short: we observed that newly created cinder volume(1GB size) was attached to compute node instance, but an instance recognized it as a 115GB volume, which(this 115GB volume) in fact was connected to another instance on the same compute node. [1. Test environment] Compute node: OpenStack Ussuri configured with Huawei dorado as a storage backend(configuration driver is available here: https://docs.openstack.org/cinder/rocky/configuration/block-storage/drivers/huawei-storage-driver.html) Packages: v# dpkg -l | grep libvirt ii libvirt-clients 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Programs for the libvirt library ii libvirt-daemon 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii libvirt-daemon-driver-storage-rbd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon RBD storage driver ii libvirt-daemon-system 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files ii libvirt-daemon-system-systemd 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Libvirt daemon configuration files (systemd) ii libvirt0:amd64 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 library for interfacing with different virtualization systems ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-libvirt 6.1.0-1 amd64 libvirt Python 3 bindings # dpkg -l | grep qemu ii ipxe-qemu 1.0.0+git-20190109.133f4c4-0ubuntu3.2 all PXE boot firmware - ROM images for qemu ii ipxe-qemu-256k-compat-efi-roms 1.0.0+git-20150424.a25a16d-0ubuntu4 all PXE boot firmware - Compat EFI ROM images for qemu ii libvirt-daemon-driver-qemu 6.0.0-0ubuntu8.16 amd64 Virtualization daemon QEMU connection driver ii qemu 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 fast processor emulator, dummy package ii qemu-block-extra:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 extra block backend modules for qemu-system and qemu-utils ii qemu-kvm 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU Full virtualization on x86 hardware ii qemu-system-common 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (common files) ii qemu-system-data 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 all QEMU full system emulation (data files) ii qemu-system-gui:amd64 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (user interface and audio support) ii qemu-system-x86 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU full system emulation binaries (x86) ii qemu-utils 1:4.2-3ubuntu6.23 amd64 QEMU utilities # dpkg -l | grep nova ii nova-common 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - common files ii nova-compute 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node base ii nova-compute-kvm 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node (KVM) ii nova-compute-libvirt 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute - compute node libvirt support ii python3-nova 2:21.2.4-0ubuntu1 all OpenStack Compute Python 3 libraries ii python3-novaclient 2:17.0.0-0ubuntu1 all client library for OpenStack Compute API - 3.x # dpkg -l | grep multipath ii multipath-tools 0.8.3-1ubuntu2 amd64 maintain multipath block device access # dpkg -l | grep iscsi ii libiscsi7:amd64 1.18.0-2 amd64 iSCSI client shared library ii open-iscsi 2.0.874-7.1ubuntu6.2 amd64 iSCSI initiator tools # cat /etc/lsb-release DISTRIB_ID=Ubuntu DISTRIB_RELEASE=20.04 DISTRIB_CODENAME=focal DISTRIB_DESCRIPTION="Ubuntu 20.04.4 LTS" Instance OS: Debian-11-amd64 [2. Test scenario] Already created instance with two volumes attached. First - 10GB for root system, second - 115GB used as vdb. Recognized by compute node as vda - dm-11, vdb - dm-9: # virsh domblklist 90fas439-fc0e-4e22-8d0b-6f2a18eee5c1  Target Source ----------------------  vda /dev/dm-11  vdb /dev/dm-9 # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running   `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6acaa2900002f6a dm-11 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=10G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:3 sdq 65:0 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:3 sdr 65:16 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:3 sdp 8:240 active ready running   `- 17:0:0:3 sds 65:32 active ready running Creating a new instance, with the same OS guest system and 10GB root volume. After successful deployment, creating a new volume(1GB) size and attaching it to newly created instance. We can see after that: # multipath -ll (...) 36e00084100ee7e7ed6ad25d900002f6b dm-9 HUAWEI,XSG1 size=115G features='0' hwhandler='0' wp=rw `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=1 status=active   |- 14:0:0:10 sdao 66:128 failed faulty running   |- 14:0:0:4 sdm 8:192 active ready running   |- 15:0:0:10 sdap 66:144 failed faulty running   |- 15:0:0:4 sdo 8:224 active ready running   |- 16:0:0:10 sdan 66:112 failed faulty running   |- 16:0:0:4 sdl 8:176 active ready running   |- 17:0:0:10 sdaq 66:160 failed faulty running   `- 17:0:0:4 sdn 8:208 active ready running This way at instance we were able to see a new drive - not 1GB, but 115GB -> so it seems it was incorrectly attached and this way we were able to destroy some data on that volume. Additionaly we were able to see many errors like that in compute node logs: # dmesg -T | grep dm-9 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 62918760 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 2 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:42 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 33625152 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 6 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66663000 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:46 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66598120 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 5 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:51 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66638680 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 12 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66614344 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 1 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66469296 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 24 prio class 0 [Fri Jan 27 13:37:56 2023] blk_update_request: critical target error, dev dm-9, sector 66586472 op 0x1:(WRITE) flags 0x8800 phys_seg 3 prio class 0 (...) Unfortunately we do not know what is a perfect test-scenario for it as we could face such issue in less than 2% of our tries, but it looks like a serious security breach. Additionally we observed that linux kernel is not fully clearing a device allocation(from volume detach), so some of drives names are visible in an output, i.e. lsblk command. Then, after new volume attachment we can see such names(i.e. sdao, sdap, sdan and so on) are reusable by that drive and wrongly mapped by multipath/iscsi to another drive and this way we hit an issue. Our question is why linux kernel of compute node is not removing devices allocation and this way is leading to a scenario like that? Maybe this can be a solution here. Thanks in advance for your help and understanding. In case when more details is needed, do not hesitate to contact me.
2023-05-10 14:29:45 Jeremy Stanley information type Private Security Public Security
2023-05-10 14:30:44 Jeremy Stanley bug task added ossn
2023-05-10 14:31:05 Jeremy Stanley ossn: importance Undecided High
2023-05-10 14:31:05 Jeremy Stanley ossn: status New In Progress
2023-05-10 14:31:05 Jeremy Stanley ossn: assignee Jeremy Stanley (fungi)
2023-05-10 14:35:08 OpenStack Infra glance-store: status New In Progress
2023-05-10 14:37:05 OpenStack Infra cinder: status New In Progress
2023-05-10 14:38:16 OpenStack Infra nova/zed: status New In Progress
2023-05-10 14:38:23 Jeremy Stanley summary Unauthorized volume access through deleted volume attachments (CVE-2023-2088) [OSSA-2023-003] Unauthorized volume access through deleted volume attachments (CVE-2023-2088)
2023-05-10 14:38:39 OpenStack Infra nova/yoga: status New In Progress
2023-05-10 14:39:19 OpenStack Infra nova/xena: status New In Progress
2023-05-10 14:39:49 OpenStack Infra os-brick: status New In Progress
2023-05-10 14:40:35 OpenStack Infra nova: status New In Progress
2023-05-10 15:06:01 OpenStack Infra nova/wallaby: status New In Progress
2023-05-10 15:08:52 melanie witt nova/antelope: status New In Progress
2023-05-10 17:24:01 OpenStack Infra ossa: status In Progress Fix Released
2023-05-10 17:27:03 Jeremy Stanley ossn: status In Progress Fix Released
2023-05-10 18:09:44 OpenStack Infra glance-store: status In Progress Fix Released
2023-05-10 20:46:23 OpenStack Infra nova/zed: status In Progress Fix Committed
2023-05-10 21:25:54 OpenStack Infra nova/yoga: status In Progress Fix Committed
2023-05-10 21:26:00 OpenStack Infra nova/xena: status In Progress Fix Committed
2023-05-10 22:29:10 OpenStack Infra tags in-stable-yoga
2023-05-10 23:05:40 OpenStack Infra nova: status In Progress Fix Released
2023-05-10 23:53:23 OpenStack Infra tags in-stable-yoga in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed
2023-05-11 10:12:53 OpenStack Infra cinder: status In Progress Fix Released
2023-05-11 10:26:45 Maksim Malchuk bug task added kolla-ansible
2023-05-11 10:27:14 Maksim Malchuk nominated for series kolla-ansible/zed
2023-05-11 10:27:14 Maksim Malchuk bug task added kolla-ansible/zed
2023-05-11 10:27:45 Maksim Malchuk kolla-ansible: status New In Progress
2023-05-11 18:00:37 OpenStack Infra kolla-ansible/zed: status New Fix Committed
2023-05-15 11:34:46 OpenStack Infra tags in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed in-stable-wallaby in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed
2023-05-15 15:12:55 OpenStack Infra tags in-stable-wallaby in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed in-stable-wallaby in-stable-xena in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed
2023-05-17 08:54:21 Christian Rohmann bug added subscriber Christian Rohmann
2023-05-17 11:06:02 OpenStack Infra nova/antelope: status In Progress Fix Released
2023-05-17 11:06:14 OpenStack Infra nova/yoga: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2023-05-17 11:06:31 OpenStack Infra kolla-ansible/zed: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2023-05-17 12:20:14 Waldemar Reger bug added subscriber Waldemar Reger
2023-05-18 15:22:55 OpenStack Infra nova/wallaby: status In Progress Fix Committed
2023-05-20 00:40:01 melanie witt nova/zed: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2023-05-26 14:59:04 Felipe Reyes bug added subscriber Felipe Reyes
2023-06-08 18:40:53 OpenStack Infra tags in-stable-wallaby in-stable-xena in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed in-stable-ussuri in-stable-wallaby in-stable-xena in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed
2023-06-08 18:40:58 OpenStack Infra tags in-stable-ussuri in-stable-wallaby in-stable-xena in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed in-stable-ussuri in-stable-victoria in-stable-wallaby in-stable-xena in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed
2023-06-08 18:41:04 OpenStack Infra tags in-stable-ussuri in-stable-victoria in-stable-wallaby in-stable-xena in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed in-stable-train in-stable-ussuri in-stable-victoria in-stable-wallaby in-stable-xena in-stable-yoga in-stable-zed
2023-06-09 04:30:54 Avinash Hanwate removed subscriber Avinash Hanwate
2023-11-07 11:26:12 Michal Nasiadka kolla-ansible: status In Progress Fix Released
2024-03-05 18:49:03 OpenStack Infra nova/wallaby: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2024-03-05 18:51:00 OpenStack Infra nova/xena: status Fix Committed Fix Released