Reviewed:  https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/cinder/+/882839
Committed: https://opendev.org/openstack/cinder/commit/68fdc323369943f494541a3510e71290b091359f
Submitter: "Zuul (22348)"
Branch:    stable/xena

commit 68fdc323369943f494541a3510e71290b091359f
Author: Gorka Eguileor <email address hidden>
Date:   Thu Feb 16 15:57:15 2023 +0100

    Reject unsafe delete attachment calls
    
    Due to how the Linux SCSI kernel driver works there are some storage
    systems, such as iSCSI with shared targets, where a normal user can
    access other projects' volume data connected to the same compute host
    using the attachments REST API.
    
    This affects both single and multi-pathed connections.
    
    To prevent users from doing this, unintentionally or maliciously,
    cinder-api will now reject some delete attachment requests that are
    deemed unsafe.
    
    Cinder will process the delete attachment request normally in the
    following cases:
    
    - The request comes from an OpenStack service that is sending the
      service token that has one of the roles in `service_token_roles`.
    - Attachment doesn't have an instance_uuid value
    - The instance for the attachment doesn't exist in Nova
    - According to Nova the volume is not connected to the instance
    - Nova is not using this attachment record
    
    There are 3 operations in the actions REST API endpoint that can be used
    for an attack:
    
    - `os-terminate_connection`: Terminate volume attachment
    - `os-detach`: Detach a volume
    - `os-force_detach`: Force detach a volume
    
    In this endpoint we just won't allow most requests not coming from a
    service. The rules we apply are the same as for attachment delete
    explained earlier, but in this case we may not have the attachment id
    and be more restrictive.  This should not be a problem for normal
    operations because:
    
    - Cinder backup doesn't use the REST API but RPC calls via RabbitMQ
    - Glance doesn't use this interface
    
    Checking whether it's a service or not is done at the cinder-api level
    by checking that the service user that made the call has at least one of
    the roles in the `service_token_roles` configuration. These roles are
    retrieved from keystone by the keystone middleware using the value of
    the "X-Service-Token" header.
    
    If Cinder is configured with `service_token_roles_required = true` and
    an attacker provides non-service valid credentials the service will
    return a 401 error, otherwise it'll return 409 as if a normal user had
    made the call without the service token.
    
    Closes-Bug: #2004555
    Change-Id: I612905a1bf4a1706cce913c0d8a6df7a240d599a
    (cherry picked from commit 6df1839bdf288107c600b3e53dff7593a6d4c161)
    Conflicts:
            cinder/exception.py
    (cherry picked from commit dd6010a9f7bf8cbe0189992f0848515321781747)
    (cherry picked from commit cb4682fb836912225c5da1536108a0d05fd5c46e)
    Conflicts:
            cinder/exception.py
    (cherry picked from commit a66f4afa22fc5a0a85d5224a6b63dd766fef47b1)
    Conflicts:
            cinder/compute/nova.py
            cinder/tests/unit/attachments/test_attachments_api.py
            cinder/volume/api.py