Reviewed:  https://review.openstack.org/432506
Committed: https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/neutron/commit/?id=ae9d1160bdaedc23dd6a1a0a85c09b8e65422a13
Submitter: Jenkins
Branch:    master

commit ae9d1160bdaedc23dd6a1a0a85c09b8e65422a13
Author: Kevin Benton <email address hidden>
Date:   Thu Feb 9 00:27:20 2017 -0800

    Stop making IP-specific provider rules in SG code
    
    Setting up rules to allow DHCPv6, DHCP, and RAs from specific
    IP addresses based on Neutron resources has a few issues:
    
    1. It violates separation of concerns. We are implementing logic to
       calculate where an IPv6 RA advertisement or DHCP advertisement
       should be coming from in the security group code. This code should
       not be trying to guess IPv6 LLAs, know about subnet modes, DHCP server
       implementations, or the type of L3 plugin being used. Currently all
       of these assumptions are baked into code that should only be
       filtering, which makes it very rigid and brittle when it comes to
       other implementations for DHCP and/or RAs.
    2. It has scaling issues on large networks. Every time one of these
       provider rules is updated, it triggers every L2 agent to refresh
       all of the security group rules for ports in that network, which puts
       significant load on the server.
    3. It's main purpose: preventing spoofing of RA[1,2] and DHCP packets,
       has long been superceded by preventing VMs from acting as DHCP/RA
       servers[3][4].
    
    This patch completely removes all of this logic and just returns
    static provider rules to the agents that allow all DHCP server
    and RA traffic ingress to the client. This addresses the issues
    highlighted above since the code is significantly simplified and
    the provider rules don't require refreshes on the agents.
    
    Now that the provider rules never change, the RPC notification
    listener on the agent-side for 'notify_provider_updated' is now
    just a NOOP that doesn't trigger any refreshes. The notification
    was left in place on the server side for older version agents
    that have stale IP-specific provider rules. The entire notification
    can be removed in the future.
    
    The one open concern with this approach is that VMs will now be
    able to receive DHCP offers from other DHCP servers on the same
    network that aren't being filtered (e.g. a VM with port security
    disabled or another device on a provider network). In order to
    address this for DHCP, this patch adds two rules that only allow
    DHCP offers targeted to either the broadcast or the correct client
    IP. This prevents incorrect offers from ever reaching the client.
    For RAs, this patch just allows all RAs so we may pick up
    advertisements from other v6 routers attached to a network;
    however, the instance won't actually be allowed to use bad addresses.
    
    1. https://bugs.launchpad.net/neutron/+bug/1262759
    2. I1d5c7aaa8e4cf057204eb746c0faab2c70409a94
    3. Ice1c9dd349864da28806c5053e38ef86f43b7771
    4. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/neutron/tree/
       neutron/agent/linux/iptables_firewall.py
       ?h=521b1074f17574a5234843bce68f3810995e0e1d#n475
    Closes-Bug: #1653830
    Closes-Bug: #1663077
    Change-Id: Ibfbf011284cbde396f74db9d982993f994082731