Activity log for bug #1410984

Date Who What changed Old value New value Message
2015-01-14 21:33:52 Armando Migliaccio bug added bug
2015-01-14 21:33:52 Armando Migliaccio attachment added bug-fix.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1410984/+attachment/4298654/+files/bug-fix.patch
2015-01-14 21:35:08 Armando Migliaccio summary Routers can be cross plugged by other tenants DVR Routers ports ownership can be edited
2015-01-14 21:35:26 Armando Migliaccio summary DVR Routers ports ownership can be edited special routers ports' ownership can be edited
2015-01-14 21:36:08 Armando Migliaccio description This is basically a sister bug of bug #1243327, but applies to DVR and, possibly, HA routers. This affects plugins that support DVR/HA, which right now is just ML2/OVS. In a nutshell what happens is that check _enforce_device_owner_not_router_intf_or_device_id in [1] is skipped, instead of being forbidden. From a data plane standpoint, since these routers work a bit differently from centralized routers, there is no actual cross plugging. In fact, since DVR routers will do the interface plugging only after a network has been attached to the router; this makes the exploit a lot more difficult to achieve, but the fix provided at least prevents malicious attempts from creative people. [1] https://github.com/openstack/neutron/blob/stable/juno/neutron/db/db_base_plugin_v2.py#L1493 (stable/juno) Patch applies for master attached, which applies cleanly to Juno. This is basically a sister bug of bug #1243327, but applies to DVR and, possibly, HA routers. This affects plugins that support DVR/HA, which right now is just ML2/OVS. In a nutshell what happens is that check _enforce_device_owner_not_router_intf_or_device_id in [1] is skipped, instead of being forbidden. From a data plane standpoint, since these routers work a bit differently from centralized routers, there is no actual cross plugging. In fact, since DVR routers will do the interface plugging only after a network has been attached to the router, this makes the exploit a lot more difficult to achieve, but the fix provided at least prevents malicious attempts from creative people. [1] https://github.com/openstack/neutron/blob/stable/juno/neutron/db/db_base_plugin_v2.py#L1493 (stable/juno) Patch applies for master attached, which applies cleanly to Juno.
2015-01-14 21:50:17 Tristan Cacqueray description This is basically a sister bug of bug #1243327, but applies to DVR and, possibly, HA routers. This affects plugins that support DVR/HA, which right now is just ML2/OVS. In a nutshell what happens is that check _enforce_device_owner_not_router_intf_or_device_id in [1] is skipped, instead of being forbidden. From a data plane standpoint, since these routers work a bit differently from centralized routers, there is no actual cross plugging. In fact, since DVR routers will do the interface plugging only after a network has been attached to the router, this makes the exploit a lot more difficult to achieve, but the fix provided at least prevents malicious attempts from creative people. [1] https://github.com/openstack/neutron/blob/stable/juno/neutron/db/db_base_plugin_v2.py#L1493 (stable/juno) Patch applies for master attached, which applies cleanly to Juno. This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added as to the bug as attachments. This is basically a sister bug of bug #1243327, but applies to DVR and, possibly, HA routers. This affects plugins that support DVR/HA, which right now is just ML2/OVS. In a nutshell what happens is that check _enforce_device_owner_not_router_intf_or_device_id in [1] is skipped, instead of being forbidden. From a data plane standpoint, since these routers work a bit differently from centralized routers, there is no actual cross plugging. In fact, since DVR routers will do the interface plugging only after a network has been attached to the router, this makes the exploit a lot more difficult to achieve, but the fix provided at least prevents malicious attempts from creative people. [1] https://github.com/openstack/neutron/blob/stable/juno/neutron/db/db_base_plugin_v2.py#L1493 (stable/juno) Patch applies for master attached, which applies cleanly to Juno.
2015-01-14 21:50:27 Tristan Cacqueray bug task added ossa
2015-01-14 21:50:33 Tristan Cacqueray ossa: status New Incomplete
2015-01-14 21:54:09 Tristan Cacqueray bug added subscriber Salvatore Orlando
2015-01-20 18:07:27 Armando Migliaccio neutron: assignee Armando Migliaccio (armando-migliaccio)
2015-02-06 00:20:58 Jeremy Stanley information type Private Security Public
2015-02-06 00:21:09 Jeremy Stanley ossa: status Incomplete Won't Fix
2015-02-06 03:20:36 Armando Migliaccio neutron: importance Undecided High
2015-02-06 03:20:43 Armando Migliaccio tags l3-dvr-backlog
2015-02-06 03:27:28 OpenStack Infra neutron: status New In Progress
2015-02-07 02:01:26 Armando Migliaccio tags l3-dvr-backlog juno-backport-potential l3-dvr-backlog
2015-02-07 02:01:32 Armando Migliaccio neutron: milestone kilo-3
2015-02-10 06:08:29 OpenStack Infra neutron: status In Progress Fix Committed
2015-02-10 13:57:20 Armando Migliaccio tags juno-backport-potential l3-dvr-backlog l3-dvr-backlog
2015-03-19 16:27:51 Thierry Carrez neutron: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2015-04-30 09:44:09 Thierry Carrez neutron: milestone kilo-3 2015.1.0
2020-02-27 23:59:44 Jeremy Stanley description This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added as to the bug as attachments. This is basically a sister bug of bug #1243327, but applies to DVR and, possibly, HA routers. This affects plugins that support DVR/HA, which right now is just ML2/OVS. In a nutshell what happens is that check _enforce_device_owner_not_router_intf_or_device_id in [1] is skipped, instead of being forbidden. From a data plane standpoint, since these routers work a bit differently from centralized routers, there is no actual cross plugging. In fact, since DVR routers will do the interface plugging only after a network has been attached to the router, this makes the exploit a lot more difficult to achieve, but the fix provided at least prevents malicious attempts from creative people. [1] https://github.com/openstack/neutron/blob/stable/juno/neutron/db/db_base_plugin_v2.py#L1493 (stable/juno) Patch applies for master attached, which applies cleanly to Juno. This is basically a sister bug of bug #1243327, but applies to DVR and, possibly, HA routers. This affects plugins that support DVR/HA, which right now is just ML2/OVS. In a nutshell what happens is that check _enforce_device_owner_not_router_intf_or_device_id in [1] is skipped, instead of being forbidden. From a data plane standpoint, since these routers work a bit differently from centralized routers, there is no actual cross plugging. In fact, since DVR routers will do the interface plugging only after a network has been attached to the router, this makes the exploit a lot more difficult to achieve, but the fix provided at least prevents malicious attempts from creative people. [1] https://github.com/openstack/neutron/blob/stable/juno/neutron/db/db_base_plugin_v2.py#L1493 (stable/juno) Patch applies for master attached, which applies cleanly to Juno.