local priviledge escalation: users can self-promote to admin
| Affects | Status | Importance | Assigned to | Milestone | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MAAS |
Fix Released
|
High
|
Jacopo Rota | ||
| 3.3 |
Fix Released
|
High
|
Jacopo Rota | ||
| 3.4 |
Fix Released
|
High
|
Jacopo Rota | ||
| 3.5 |
Fix Released
|
High
|
Jacopo Rota | ||
| 3.6 |
Fix Released
|
High
|
Jacopo Rota | ||
Bug Description
Describe the bug:
Users can self-promote to admin by patching a request to the users websocket handler and change the `is_superuser` property. By intercepting the request - such as during a password change or profile update - an attacker can manually change the is_superuser value from false to true.
Steps to reproduce:
Intercept the user.update and change the `is_superuser` property to True. After that the user has full admin power.
Expected behavior (what should have happened?):
Server error
Actual behavior (what actually happened?):
The user becomes admin
MAAS version and installation type (deb, snap):
Any
MAAS setup (HA, single node, multiple regions/racks):
Any
Host OS distro and version:
Any
Additional context:
CVE References
| description: | updated |
| Changed in maas: | |
| milestone: | 3.7.0 → 3.7.0-beta1 |
| Changed in maas: | |
| status: | Fix Committed → Fix Released |

3.7 is fixed because the UI migrated to the v3 api and they are not vulnerable to this exploit.