security group table doesn't observe Neutron policy settings

Bug #1915308 reported by Andrew Bogott
10
This bug affects 1 person
Affects Status Importance Assigned to Milestone
OpenStack Dashboard (Horizon)
Fix Released
Undecided
Andrew Bogott
OpenStack Security Advisory
Won't Fix
Undecided
Unassigned

Bug Description

The security group panel enables all actions (create/edit/delete/manage rules/etc.) regardless of the network policy.yaml settings or user account.

In the code there's this telling readme:

# TODO(amotoki): [drop-nova-network] Add neutron policy support

In my deployment this is a bit alarming -- users who are intended to be read-only are nonetheless invited to delete things. Of course the Neutron backend /does/ observe the policy so this is ugly but not usually an actual security risk unless people have different back-end and front-end policy files.

I'm flagging as security-related nonetheless for the odd edge case where it poses a risk.

Changed in horizon:
assignee: nobody → Andrew Bogott (andrewbogott)
description: updated
Revision history for this message
Jeremy Stanley (fungi) wrote :

Since this report concerns a possible security risk, an incomplete
security advisory task has been added while the core security
reviewers for the affected project or projects confirm the bug and
discuss the scope of any vulnerability along with potential
solutions.

description: updated
Changed in ossa:
status: New → Incomplete
Revision history for this message
Jeremy Stanley (fungi) wrote :

I suppose whether this is effectively exploitable by an attacker and whether it can be safely fixed with a source patch in supported stable branches will determine whether we publish an advisory (OSSA). Also it doesn't seem like it's severe enough to warrant discussing in private even if it is exploitable in some cases. What do the Horizon core security reviewers think? Shall we switch it to public or is there additional risk here which isn't immediately apparent?

Revision history for this message
Akihiro Motoki (amotoki) wrote :

I don't think it allows attacker or malicious users to operate security groups. Even if horizon does not honor RBAC policies and shows create/delete buttons to GUI users, actual operations cannot be done because the policies are enforced by neutron. Users can see these buttons but actual operations would fail when calling the neutron API.
Thus, I think it is not a vulnerability but an improvement requrement of horizon UI. I agree that this can be public.

Revision history for this message
Akihiro Motoki (amotoki) wrote :

Correction of the last sentence of my comment: s/improvement requirement/improvement request/

Revision history for this message
Akihiro Motoki (amotoki) wrote :

In addition, the related fix was pushed to gerrit publicly. We donn't need to keep this bug private.

Revision history for this message
Jeremy Stanley (fungi) wrote :

Thanks, I've switched this to a normal public bug and set our security advisory task to Won't Fix indicating there shouldn't be any advisory publication required. The OpenStack VMT is treating this as a class E report (neither a vulnerability nor hardening opportunity) per our taxonomy: https://security.openstack.org/vmt-process.html#incident-report-taxonomy

description: updated
information type: Private Security → Public
Changed in ossa:
status: Incomplete → Won't Fix
Revision history for this message
Vishal Manchanda (vishalmanchanda) wrote :
Changed in horizon:
status: New → Fix Released
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