Activity log for bug #1555590

Date Who What changed Old value New value Message
2016-03-10 12:09:57 Stuart McLaren bug added bug
2016-03-10 12:36:42 Tristan Cacqueray bug task added ossa
2016-03-10 12:36:55 Tristan Cacqueray description When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image: $ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2 +------------------+--------------------------------------+ | Property | Value | +------------------+--------------------------------------+ | checksum | None | | container_format | bare | | created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 | | deleted | False | | deleted_at | None | | disk_format | raw | | id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 | | is_public | False | | min_disk | 0 | | min_ram | 0 | | name | img2 | | owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d | | protected | False | | size | 37 | | status | active | | updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 | | virtual_size | None | +------------------+--------------------------------------+ Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address. The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens. In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them. This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. -- When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:  $ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2  +------------------+--------------------------------------+  | Property | Value |  +------------------+--------------------------------------+  | checksum | None |  | container_format | bare |  | created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |  | deleted | False |  | deleted_at | None |  | disk_format | raw |  | id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |  | is_public | False |  | min_disk | 0 |  | min_ram | 0 |  | name | img2 |  | owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |  | protected | False |  | size | 37 |  | status | active |  | updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |  | virtual_size | None |  +------------------+--------------------------------------+ Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address. The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens. In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them.
2016-03-10 12:36:58 Tristan Cacqueray ossa: status New Incomplete
2016-03-10 12:37:14 Tristan Cacqueray bug added subscriber Glance Core security contacts
2016-03-14 15:45:27 Tristan Cacqueray bug added subscriber OSSG CoreSec
2016-05-03 21:54:19 Tristan Cacqueray ossa: status Incomplete Opinion
2016-05-31 19:53:43 Nikhil Komawar bug added subscriber Nova Core security contacts
2016-05-31 19:53:52 Nikhil Komawar glance: status New Confirmed
2016-05-31 19:53:58 Nikhil Komawar glance: importance Undecided High
2017-09-25 18:24:51 Tristan Cacqueray bug task added ossn
2020-02-27 20:22:34 Jeremy Stanley description This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. -- When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:  $ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2  +------------------+--------------------------------------+  | Property | Value |  +------------------+--------------------------------------+  | checksum | None |  | container_format | bare |  | created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |  | deleted | False |  | deleted_at | None |  | disk_format | raw |  | id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |  | is_public | False |  | min_disk | 0 |  | min_ram | 0 |  | name | img2 |  | owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |  | protected | False |  | size | 37 |  | status | active |  | updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |  | virtual_size | None |  +------------------+--------------------------------------+ Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address. The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens. In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them. This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2020-05-27 and will be made public by or on that date if no fix is identified. When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:  $ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2  +------------------+--------------------------------------+  | Property | Value |  +------------------+--------------------------------------+  | checksum | None |  | container_format | bare |  | created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |  | deleted | False |  | deleted_at | None |  | disk_format | raw |  | id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |  | is_public | False |  | min_disk | 0 |  | min_ram | 0 |  | name | img2 |  | owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |  | protected | False |  | size | 37 |  | status | active |  | updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |  | virtual_size | None |  +------------------+--------------------------------------+ Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address. The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens. In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them.
2020-05-27 16:58:25 Jeremy Stanley description This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2020-05-27 and will be made public by or on that date if no fix is identified. When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:  $ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2  +------------------+--------------------------------------+  | Property | Value |  +------------------+--------------------------------------+  | checksum | None |  | container_format | bare |  | created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |  | deleted | False |  | deleted_at | None |  | disk_format | raw |  | id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |  | is_public | False |  | min_disk | 0 |  | min_ram | 0 |  | name | img2 |  | owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |  | protected | False |  | size | 37 |  | status | active |  | updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |  | virtual_size | None |  +------------------+--------------------------------------+ Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address. The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens. In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them. When the glance server is running with a multi-tenant swift store, it is possible to use a command such as the following to create an image:  $ glance --os-image-api-version 1 image-create --location swift+http://192.168.1.103:8080/v1/AUTH_1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d/glance_a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842/a785957a-1340-498c-9427-3a549fc06842 --disk-format raw --container-format bare --name img2  +------------------+--------------------------------------+  | Property | Value |  +------------------+--------------------------------------+  | checksum | None |  | container_format | bare |  | created_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |  | deleted | False |  | deleted_at | None |  | disk_format | raw |  | id | 3fae88b9-3b2b-4dca-88f1-c89615dbdbf8 |  | is_public | False |  | min_disk | 0 |  | min_ram | 0 |  | name | img2 |  | owner | 1a93b08616534cfa88af4ecaf5dbb35d |  | protected | False |  | size | 37 |  | status | active |  | updated_at | 2016-03-10T11:37:02.000000 |  | virtual_size | None |  +------------------+--------------------------------------+ Subsequent requests for that image will send a request, *including a token*, to the specified URL. The URL can contain any IP address. The URL can be anything. It could for example be a 'bad' swift server, controlled by the image creator, which allows anonymous access to the object in question while logging the incoming tokens. In this way one user can access valid tokens of all users which access the image in question. Other users may access that image if it is a public image, or if it has been shared with them.
2020-05-27 16:58:31 Jeremy Stanley information type Private Security Public