Activity log for bug #1823200

Date Who What changed Old value New value Message
2019-04-04 16:10:35 Eric Harney bug added bug
2019-04-04 16:13:28 Eric Harney bug added subscriber Summer Long
2019-04-04 16:34:46 Eric Harney bug added subscriber Matan Sabag
2019-04-04 16:34:58 Eric Harney bug added subscriber Helen Walsh
2019-04-04 17:07:44 Jeremy Stanley description The ScaleIO driver uses the backend storage login and password for authentication for connections to the volume as well as the management API. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n176 https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n229 This has a few serious implications: a) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to a different tenant's volume. Most drivers create per-volume credentials. b) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to the ScaleIO management API and presumably do lots of things they shouldn't be allowed to. Most drivers create credentials for volumes that are independent of the management credentials. c) If the password is changed on the backend ScaleIO volumes that are currently being used stop working, because Nova stores the old password in its block_device_mapping table. (Not a security problem other than the fact that it prevents rotation of passwords, but definitely a bug.) Parts of these issues are separately being looked at in bug 1736773, (which generally advises that in some clouds, only Nova should be able to see connection info, not end users) but the situation there is worse for the ScaleIO driver because most drivers only put usernames/passwords in connection_info that are usable for a single volume, not for the storage backend itself. This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. The ScaleIO driver uses the backend storage login and password for authentication for connections to the volume as well as the management API. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n176 https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n229 This has a few serious implications: a) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to a different tenant's volume. Most drivers create per-volume credentials. b) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to the ScaleIO management API and presumably do lots of things they shouldn't be allowed to. Most drivers create credentials for volumes that are independent of the management credentials. c) If the password is changed on the backend ScaleIO volumes that are currently being used stop working, because Nova stores the old password in its block_device_mapping table. (Not a security problem other than the fact that it prevents rotation of passwords, but definitely a bug.) Parts of these issues are separately being looked at in bug 1736773, (which generally advises that in some clouds, only Nova should be able to see connection info, not end users) but the situation there is worse for the ScaleIO driver because most drivers only put usernames/passwords in connection_info that are usable for a single volume, not for the storage backend itself.
2019-04-04 17:07:57 Jeremy Stanley bug task added ossa
2019-04-04 17:08:06 Jeremy Stanley ossa: status New Incomplete
2019-04-04 17:08:31 Jeremy Stanley bug added subscriber Cinder Core security contacts
2020-02-27 23:52:45 Jeremy Stanley description This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. The ScaleIO driver uses the backend storage login and password for authentication for connections to the volume as well as the management API. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n176 https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n229 This has a few serious implications: a) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to a different tenant's volume. Most drivers create per-volume credentials. b) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to the ScaleIO management API and presumably do lots of things they shouldn't be allowed to. Most drivers create credentials for volumes that are independent of the management credentials. c) If the password is changed on the backend ScaleIO volumes that are currently being used stop working, because Nova stores the old password in its block_device_mapping table. (Not a security problem other than the fact that it prevents rotation of passwords, but definitely a bug.) Parts of these issues are separately being looked at in bug 1736773, (which generally advises that in some clouds, only Nova should be able to see connection info, not end users) but the situation there is worse for the ScaleIO driver because most drivers only put usernames/passwords in connection_info that are usable for a single volume, not for the storage backend itself. This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2020-05-27 and will be made public by or on that date if no fix is identified. The ScaleIO driver uses the backend storage login and password for authentication for connections to the volume as well as the management API. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n176 https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n229 This has a few serious implications: a) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to a different tenant's volume. Most drivers create per-volume credentials. b) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to the ScaleIO management API and presumably do lots of things they shouldn't be allowed to. Most drivers create credentials for volumes that are independent of the management credentials. c) If the password is changed on the backend ScaleIO volumes that are currently being used stop working, because Nova stores the old password in its block_device_mapping table. (Not a security problem other than the fact that it prevents rotation of passwords, but definitely a bug.) Parts of these issues are separately being looked at in bug 1736773, (which generally advises that in some clouds, only Nova should be able to see connection info, not end users) but the situation there is worse for the ScaleIO driver because most drivers only put usernames/passwords in connection_info that are usable for a single volume, not for the storage backend itself.
2020-04-27 22:34:07 Sean McGinnis cinder: assignee Ivan Pchelintsev (pcheli)
2020-05-13 09:28:51 Sean McGinnis bug added subscriber Ivan Pchelintsev
2020-05-19 11:35:25 Ivan Pchelintsev attachment added cinder.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5374057/+files/cinder.patch
2020-05-19 11:35:55 Ivan Pchelintsev attachment added os-brick.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5374058/+files/os-brick.patch
2020-05-19 18:12:43 Jeremy Stanley description This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2020-05-27 and will be made public by or on that date if no fix is identified. The ScaleIO driver uses the backend storage login and password for authentication for connections to the volume as well as the management API. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n176 https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n229 This has a few serious implications: a) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to a different tenant's volume. Most drivers create per-volume credentials. b) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to the ScaleIO management API and presumably do lots of things they shouldn't be allowed to. Most drivers create credentials for volumes that are independent of the management credentials. c) If the password is changed on the backend ScaleIO volumes that are currently being used stop working, because Nova stores the old password in its block_device_mapping table. (Not a security problem other than the fact that it prevents rotation of passwords, but definitely a bug.) Parts of these issues are separately being looked at in bug 1736773, (which generally advises that in some clouds, only Nova should be able to see connection info, not end users) but the situation there is worse for the ScaleIO driver because most drivers only put usernames/passwords in connection_info that are usable for a single volume, not for the storage backend itself. This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2020-05-27 and will be made public by or on that date even if no fix is identified. The ScaleIO driver uses the backend storage login and password for authentication for connections to the volume as well as the management API. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n176 https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n229 This has a few serious implications: a) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to a different tenant's volume. Most drivers create per-volume credentials. b) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to the ScaleIO management API and presumably do lots of things they shouldn't be allowed to. Most drivers create credentials for volumes that are independent of the management credentials. c) If the password is changed on the backend ScaleIO volumes that are currently being used stop working, because Nova stores the old password in its block_device_mapping table. (Not a security problem other than the fact that it prevents rotation of passwords, but definitely a bug.) Parts of these issues are separately being looked at in bug 1736773, (which generally advises that in some clouds, only Nova should be able to see connection info, not end users) but the situation there is worse for the ScaleIO driver because most drivers only put usernames/passwords in connection_info that are usable for a single volume, not for the storage backend itself.
2020-05-21 02:17:14 Walt Boring cinder: importance Undecided High
2020-05-21 08:35:42 Ivan Pchelintsev attachment removed os-brick.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5374058/+files/os-brick.patch
2020-05-21 08:36:14 Ivan Pchelintsev attachment added os-brick.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5375048/+files/os-brick.patch
2020-05-21 09:07:06 Ivan Pchelintsev attachment added bug1823200.tar.gz https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5375080/+files/bug1823200.tar.gz
2020-05-22 09:41:23 Ivan Pchelintsev bug added subscriber Vladislav Belogrudov
2020-05-26 15:55:14 Brian Rosmaita cinder: status New In Progress
2020-05-26 17:28:18 Brian Rosmaita attachment added 0001-Add-OSSN-0086.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5377033/+files/0001-Add-OSSN-0086.patch
2020-05-26 19:31:28 Jeremy Stanley description This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2020-05-27 and will be made public by or on that date even if no fix is identified. The ScaleIO driver uses the backend storage login and password for authentication for connections to the volume as well as the management API. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n176 https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n229 This has a few serious implications: a) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to a different tenant's volume. Most drivers create per-volume credentials. b) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to the ScaleIO management API and presumably do lots of things they shouldn't be allowed to. Most drivers create credentials for volumes that are independent of the management credentials. c) If the password is changed on the backend ScaleIO volumes that are currently being used stop working, because Nova stores the old password in its block_device_mapping table. (Not a security problem other than the fact that it prevents rotation of passwords, but definitely a bug.) Parts of these issues are separately being looked at in bug 1736773, (which generally advises that in some clouds, only Nova should be able to see connection info, not end users) but the situation there is worse for the ScaleIO driver because most drivers only put usernames/passwords in connection_info that are usable for a single volume, not for the storage backend itself. This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2020-06-03 and will be made public by or on that date even if no fix is identified. The ScaleIO driver uses the backend storage login and password for authentication for connections to the volume as well as the management API. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n176 https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n229 This has a few serious implications: a) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to a different tenant's volume. Most drivers create per-volume credentials. b) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to the ScaleIO management API and presumably do lots of things they shouldn't be allowed to. Most drivers create credentials for volumes that are independent of the management credentials. c) If the password is changed on the backend ScaleIO volumes that are currently being used stop working, because Nova stores the old password in its block_device_mapping table. (Not a security problem other than the fact that it prevents rotation of passwords, but definitely a bug.) Parts of these issues are separately being looked at in bug 1736773, (which generally advises that in some clouds, only Nova should be able to see connection info, not end users) but the situation there is worse for the ScaleIO driver because most drivers only put usernames/passwords in connection_info that are usable for a single volume, not for the storage backend itself.
2020-05-27 12:47:29 Ivan Pchelintsev attachment added tempest_console.log https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5377399/+files/tempest_console.log
2020-05-27 14:29:22 Ivan Pchelintsev attachment added bug1823200_train.tar.gz https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5377417/+files/bug1823200_train.tar.gz
2020-05-27 15:47:12 Vladislav Belogrudov bug added subscriber Rajini Karthik
2020-05-27 15:47:39 Vladislav Belogrudov bug added subscriber arkady kanevsky
2020-05-28 12:12:26 Ivan Pchelintsev attachment added bug1823200_stein.tar.gz https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5377861/+files/bug1823200_stein.tar.gz
2020-05-29 12:39:40 Ivan Pchelintsev attachment added bug1823200_rocky.tar.gz https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5378388/+files/bug1823200_rocky.tar.gz
2020-05-29 20:04:26 Jeremy Stanley bug task added ossn
2020-05-29 20:04:39 Jeremy Stanley ossa: status Incomplete Won't Fix
2020-05-29 20:10:31 Jeremy Stanley ossn: assignee Brian Rosmaita (brian-rosmaita)
2020-05-29 20:21:04 Jeremy Stanley bug task added ossp-security-documentation
2020-05-29 20:21:55 Jeremy Stanley bug task added os-brick
2020-05-29 20:43:23 Brian Rosmaita bug added subscriber Nick Tait
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita nominated for series cinder/stein
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita bug task added cinder/stein
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita nominated for series cinder/rocky
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita bug task added cinder/rocky
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita nominated for series cinder/train
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita bug task added cinder/train
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita nominated for series cinder/victoria
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita bug task added cinder/victoria
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita nominated for series cinder/ussuri
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita bug task added cinder/ussuri
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita nominated for series cinder/queens
2020-05-29 20:53:40 Brian Rosmaita bug task added cinder/queens
2020-05-29 20:56:53 Brian Rosmaita cinder/queens: importance Undecided High
2020-05-29 20:56:53 Brian Rosmaita cinder/queens: status New In Progress
2020-05-29 20:56:53 Brian Rosmaita cinder/queens: milestone queens-em
2020-05-29 20:56:53 Brian Rosmaita cinder/queens: assignee Ivan Pchelintsev (pcheli)
2020-05-29 20:57:44 Brian Rosmaita cinder/rocky: importance Undecided High
2020-05-29 20:57:44 Brian Rosmaita cinder/rocky: status New In Progress
2020-05-29 20:57:44 Brian Rosmaita cinder/rocky: milestone rocky-em
2020-05-29 20:57:44 Brian Rosmaita cinder/rocky: assignee Ivan Pchelintsev (pcheli)
2020-05-29 20:58:39 Brian Rosmaita cinder/stein: importance Undecided High
2020-05-29 20:58:39 Brian Rosmaita cinder/stein: status New In Progress
2020-05-29 20:58:39 Brian Rosmaita cinder/stein: milestone 14.0.5
2020-05-29 20:58:39 Brian Rosmaita cinder/stein: assignee Ivan Pchelintsev (pcheli)
2020-05-29 20:59:14 Brian Rosmaita cinder/train: importance Undecided High
2020-05-29 20:59:14 Brian Rosmaita cinder/train: status New In Progress
2020-05-29 20:59:14 Brian Rosmaita cinder/train: milestone 15.1.1
2020-05-29 20:59:14 Brian Rosmaita cinder/train: assignee Ivan Pchelintsev (pcheli)
2020-05-29 20:59:47 Brian Rosmaita cinder/ussuri: importance Undecided High
2020-05-29 20:59:47 Brian Rosmaita cinder/ussuri: status New In Progress
2020-05-29 20:59:47 Brian Rosmaita cinder/ussuri: milestone 16.0.1
2020-05-29 20:59:47 Brian Rosmaita cinder/ussuri: assignee Ivan Pchelintsev (pcheli)
2020-05-29 21:00:08 Brian Rosmaita cinder/victoria: milestone victoria-1
2020-05-29 21:01:27 Brian Rosmaita os-brick: importance Undecided High
2020-05-29 21:01:27 Brian Rosmaita os-brick: status New In Progress
2020-05-29 21:01:27 Brian Rosmaita os-brick: milestone 3.1.0
2020-05-29 21:01:27 Brian Rosmaita os-brick: assignee Ivan Pchelintsev (pcheli)
2020-05-29 21:02:06 Brian Rosmaita ossn: status New In Progress
2020-05-29 21:14:46 Brian Rosmaita attachment added 0001-Add-OSSN-0086.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5378586/+files/0001-Add-OSSN-0086.patch
2020-05-29 21:15:02 Brian Rosmaita attachment removed 0001-Add-OSSN-0086.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/ossn/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5377033/+files/0001-Add-OSSN-0086.patch
2020-05-29 22:19:53 Brian Rosmaita attachment added 0001-Add-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/queens/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5378587/+files/0001-Add-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch
2020-05-30 00:01:36 Brian Rosmaita attachment added os-brick-master-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5378598/+files/os-brick-master-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch
2020-05-30 02:12:47 Brian Rosmaita attachment added cinder-master-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/queens/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5378645/+files/cinder-master-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch
2020-05-30 02:13:00 Brian Rosmaita attachment removed 0001-Add-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/queens/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5378587/+files/0001-Add-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch
2020-06-02 03:36:58 Brian Rosmaita attachment added bug-18232000-release-notes.tar https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5379622/+files/bug-18232000-release-notes.tar
2020-06-02 17:35:03 Brian Rosmaita attachment removed 0001-Add-OSSN-0086.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5378586/+files/0001-Add-OSSN-0086.patch
2020-06-02 17:36:27 Brian Rosmaita attachment added Add-OSSN-0086_still-needs-urls.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5379842/+files/Add-OSSN-0086_still-needs-urls.patch
2020-06-02 17:51:14 Brian Rosmaita attachment removed Add-OSSN-0086_still-needs-urls.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5379842/+files/Add-OSSN-0086_still-needs-urls.patch
2020-06-02 17:51:54 Brian Rosmaita attachment added Add-OSSN-0086_still-needs-urls.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5379843/+files/Add-OSSN-0086_still-needs-urls.patch
2020-06-02 18:04:59 Brian Rosmaita attachment removed bug-18232000-release-notes.tar https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5379622/+files/bug-18232000-release-notes.tar
2020-06-02 18:06:35 Brian Rosmaita attachment added bug-18232000-release-notes_new.tar https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5379856/+files/bug-18232000-release-notes_new.tar
2020-06-02 18:07:15 Brian Rosmaita attachment removed os-brick-master-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5378598/+files/os-brick-master-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch
2020-06-02 18:07:31 Brian Rosmaita attachment removed cinder-master-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch https://bugs.launchpad.net/cinder/+bug/1823200/+attachment/5378645/+files/cinder-master-release-note-for-Bug-1823200.patch
2020-06-03 11:17:49 Brian Rosmaita description This issue is being treated as a potential security risk under embargo. Please do not make any public mention of embargoed (private) security vulnerabilities before their coordinated publication by the OpenStack Vulnerability Management Team in the form of an official OpenStack Security Advisory. This includes discussion of the bug or associated fixes in public forums such as mailing lists, code review systems and bug trackers. Please also avoid private disclosure to other individuals not already approved for access to this information, and provide this same reminder to those who are made aware of the issue prior to publication. All discussion should remain confined to this private bug report, and any proposed fixes should be added to the bug as attachments. This embargo shall not extend past 2020-06-03 and will be made public by or on that date even if no fix is identified. The ScaleIO driver uses the backend storage login and password for authentication for connections to the volume as well as the management API. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n176 https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n229 This has a few serious implications: a) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to a different tenant's volume. Most drivers create per-volume credentials. b) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to the ScaleIO management API and presumably do lots of things they shouldn't be allowed to. Most drivers create credentials for volumes that are independent of the management credentials. c) If the password is changed on the backend ScaleIO volumes that are currently being used stop working, because Nova stores the old password in its block_device_mapping table. (Not a security problem other than the fact that it prevents rotation of passwords, but definitely a bug.) Parts of these issues are separately being looked at in bug 1736773, (which generally advises that in some clouds, only Nova should be able to see connection info, not end users) but the situation there is worse for the ScaleIO driver because most drivers only put usernames/passwords in connection_info that are usable for a single volume, not for the storage backend itself. The ScaleIO driver uses the backend storage login and password for authentication for connections to the volume as well as the management API. https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n176 https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/cinder/tree/cinder/volume/drivers/dell_emc/scaleio/driver.py?h=13.0.4#n229 This has a few serious implications: a) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to a different tenant's volume. Most drivers create per-volume credentials. b) A user can create a volume, retrieve the username/password from that volume, and use it to connect to the ScaleIO management API and presumably do lots of things they shouldn't be allowed to. Most drivers create credentials for volumes that are independent of the management credentials. c) If the password is changed on the backend ScaleIO volumes that are currently being used stop working, because Nova stores the old password in its block_device_mapping table. (Not a security problem other than the fact that it prevents rotation of passwords, but definitely a bug.) Parts of these issues are separately being looked at in bug 1736773, (which generally advises that in some clouds, only Nova should be able to see connection info, not end users) but the situation there is worse for the ScaleIO driver because most drivers only put usernames/passwords in connection_info that are usable for a single volume, not for the storage backend itself.
2020-06-03 11:18:14 Brian Rosmaita information type Private Security Public
2020-06-03 11:18:30 Brian Rosmaita tags security
2020-06-03 14:46:48 OpenStack Infra os-brick: status In Progress Fix Released
2020-06-03 16:26:18 OpenStack Infra cinder/ussuri: status In Progress Fix Committed
2020-06-03 16:58:43 OpenStack Infra cinder/train: status In Progress Fix Committed
2020-06-03 16:58:52 OpenStack Infra cinder/stein: status In Progress Fix Committed
2020-06-03 16:59:00 OpenStack Infra cinder/rocky: status In Progress Fix Committed
2020-06-03 16:59:09 OpenStack Infra cinder/queens: status In Progress Fix Committed
2020-06-03 17:35:25 OpenStack Infra ossp-security-documentation: status In Progress Fix Released
2020-06-03 18:20:22 Brian Rosmaita cve linked 2020-10755
2020-06-04 14:11:32 OpenStack Infra cinder: assignee Ivan Pchelintsev (pcheli) Sean McGinnis (sean-mcginnis)
2020-06-04 20:25:03 OpenStack Infra cinder: status In Progress Fix Released
2020-06-22 20:26:31 Corey Bryant bug task added python-os-brick (Ubuntu)
2020-06-22 20:26:55 Corey Bryant bug task added cinder (Ubuntu)
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant nominated for series Ubuntu Bionic
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant bug task added cinder (Ubuntu Bionic)
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant bug task added python-os-brick (Ubuntu Bionic)
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant nominated for series Ubuntu Focal
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant bug task added cinder (Ubuntu Focal)
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant bug task added python-os-brick (Ubuntu Focal)
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant nominated for series Ubuntu Groovy
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant bug task added cinder (Ubuntu Groovy)
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant bug task added python-os-brick (Ubuntu Groovy)
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant nominated for series Ubuntu Eoan
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant bug task added cinder (Ubuntu Eoan)
2020-06-22 20:27:19 Corey Bryant bug task added python-os-brick (Ubuntu Eoan)
2020-06-22 20:27:52 Corey Bryant python-os-brick (Ubuntu Groovy): importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:27:52 Corey Bryant python-os-brick (Ubuntu Groovy): status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:28:03 Ubuntu Foundations Team Bug Bot tags security patch security
2020-06-22 20:28:08 Corey Bryant python-os-brick (Ubuntu Focal): importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:28:08 Corey Bryant python-os-brick (Ubuntu Focal): status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:28:12 Ubuntu Foundations Team Bug Bot bug added subscriber Ubuntu Review Team
2020-06-22 20:28:25 Corey Bryant python-os-brick (Ubuntu Eoan): importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:28:25 Corey Bryant python-os-brick (Ubuntu Eoan): status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:28:43 Corey Bryant python-os-brick (Ubuntu Bionic): importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:28:43 Corey Bryant python-os-brick (Ubuntu Bionic): status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:29:04 Corey Bryant python-os-brick (Ubuntu Groovy): status Triaged Fix Released
2020-06-22 20:29:26 Corey Bryant cinder (Ubuntu Groovy): importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:29:26 Corey Bryant cinder (Ubuntu Groovy): status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:29:44 Corey Bryant cinder (Ubuntu Focal): importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:29:44 Corey Bryant cinder (Ubuntu Focal): status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:29:59 Corey Bryant cinder (Ubuntu Eoan): importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:29:59 Corey Bryant cinder (Ubuntu Eoan): status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:30:16 Corey Bryant cinder (Ubuntu Bionic): importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:30:16 Corey Bryant cinder (Ubuntu Bionic): status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:30:36 Corey Bryant bug task added cloud-archive
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant nominated for series cloud-archive/stein
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant bug task added cloud-archive/stein
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant nominated for series cloud-archive/train
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant bug task added cloud-archive/train
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant nominated for series cloud-archive/rocky
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant bug task added cloud-archive/rocky
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant nominated for series cloud-archive/queens
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant bug task added cloud-archive/queens
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant nominated for series cloud-archive/victoria
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant bug task added cloud-archive/victoria
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant nominated for series cloud-archive/ussuri
2020-06-22 20:30:56 Corey Bryant bug task added cloud-archive/ussuri
2020-06-22 20:31:22 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/victoria: importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:31:22 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/victoria: status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:31:40 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/ussuri: importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:31:40 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/ussuri: status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:31:59 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/train: importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:31:59 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/train: status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:32:14 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/stein: importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:32:14 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/stein: status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:32:30 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/rocky: importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:32:30 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/rocky: status New Triaged
2020-06-22 20:32:47 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/queens: importance Undecided High
2020-06-22 20:32:47 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/queens: status New Triaged
2020-06-25 05:47:47 Launchpad Janitor cinder (Ubuntu Groovy): status Triaged Fix Released
2020-06-30 20:00:58 Corey Bryant cloud-archive: status Triaged Fix Committed
2020-07-01 16:42:24 Corey Bryant cloud-archive: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2020-07-01 16:44:38 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/train: status Triaged Fix Committed
2020-07-01 16:44:42 Corey Bryant tags patch security patch security verification-train-needed
2020-07-01 16:55:27 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/stein: status Triaged Fix Committed
2020-07-01 16:55:31 Corey Bryant tags patch security verification-train-needed patch security verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed
2020-07-01 16:59:16 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/rocky: status Triaged Fix Committed
2020-07-01 16:59:20 Corey Bryant tags patch security verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed patch security verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed
2020-07-07 14:01:28 Launchpad Janitor python-os-brick (Ubuntu Focal): status Triaged Fix Released
2020-07-07 14:01:35 Launchpad Janitor python-os-brick (Ubuntu Bionic): status Triaged Fix Released
2020-07-07 14:11:36 Launchpad Janitor cinder (Ubuntu Focal): status Triaged Fix Released
2020-07-07 14:21:40 Launchpad Janitor cinder (Ubuntu Bionic): status Triaged Fix Released
2020-07-07 17:03:52 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/ussuri: status Triaged Fix Committed
2020-07-07 17:03:55 Corey Bryant tags patch security verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed patch security verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed
2020-07-08 15:45:28 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/ussuri: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2020-07-08 16:55:26 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/train: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2020-07-08 19:07:37 Corey Bryant cinder (Ubuntu Eoan): status Triaged Won't Fix
2020-07-08 19:08:02 Corey Bryant python-os-brick (Ubuntu Eoan): status Triaged Won't Fix
2020-07-08 21:11:33 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/stein: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2020-07-08 21:12:12 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/rocky: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2020-07-09 17:48:32 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/queens: status Triaged Fix Committed
2020-07-09 17:48:35 Corey Bryant tags patch security verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed patch security verification-queens-needed verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed
2020-07-13 13:57:14 Corey Bryant cloud-archive/queens: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2020-07-24 19:31:14 OpenStack Infra tags patch security verification-queens-needed verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed in-stable-pike patch security verification-queens-needed verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed
2020-08-17 21:12:32 OpenStack Infra tags in-stable-pike patch security verification-queens-needed verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed in-stable-pike in-stable-ussuri patch security verification-queens-needed verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed
2020-08-21 00:14:55 OpenStack Infra tags in-stable-pike in-stable-ussuri patch security verification-queens-needed verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed in-stable-pike in-stable-train in-stable-ussuri patch security verification-queens-needed verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed
2020-09-04 15:12:00 OpenStack Infra tags in-stable-pike in-stable-train in-stable-ussuri patch security verification-queens-needed verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed in-stable-pike in-stable-stein in-stable-train in-stable-ussuri patch security verification-queens-needed verification-rocky-needed verification-stein-needed verification-train-needed verification-ussuri-needed
2022-12-02 11:05:07 OpenStack Infra cinder/queens: status Fix Committed Fix Released
2023-05-03 13:37:13 OpenStack Infra cinder/rocky: status Fix Committed Fix Released