Forgotten password reminder is not helpful to user who enters one of their email addresses LP doesn't know

Bug #700496 reported by Peter Clifton
28
This bug affects 3 people
Affects Status Importance Assigned to Milestone
Canonical SSO provider
Fix Released
High
Simon Davy

Bug Description

DIscovered this when helping a user who could not remeber their LP login credentials.

https://login.launchpad.net/+forgot_password asks for your email address (FINE)

User enters their email address - turns out not to be the one associated with their LP account, oops.

https://login.launchpad.net/+email-sent

Tells them email has been sent to the address provided (which was a valid email address)

No email is ever delivered to the address.

I just tried this myself with an email alias LP doesn't know about, and can confirm that no email was received.

"We’ve just emailed <email address hidden> (from <email address hidden>) with instructions on resetting your password."

No email. Launchpad SHOULD have emailed me to tell me it couldn't find an account assocuiated with the email address I'd given.

Since the email address is owned by me, contacting (or attempting to contact) the user via the email address they provided doesn't leak any information to $evildoer.

The only potential for abuse is somene useing the form to send irritating email to people with no Launchpad account. (Just as they could already do to someone _with_ a Launchpad account.

(Separated out from a comment I made in Bug #700493

Escalated by toykeeper on behalf of Support CoP

Revision history for this message
DJ Delorie (djdelorie) wrote :

I suggest the text say something like "If foo@bar is a valid LP user, we've sent an email, but if it isn't, we haven't." It's not clear from that page that "don't send an email" is a perfectly valid response to the request.

Revision history for this message
Martin Pool (mbp) wrote : Re: [Bug 700496] Re: Forgotten password reminder is not helpful to user who enters one of their email addresses LP doesn't know

Or you could send a mail saying "hi, you asked for your password, but
you don't have an account at this address...."

Curtis Hovey (sinzui)
affects: launchpad → canonical-identity-provider
Revision history for this message
Dave Morley (davmor2) wrote :

The obvious solution is to send out an email inviting the user to create an account if it is an unrecognised account email, however the decision was made to send no email in these instances to protect peoples accounts and personal information. I will bring it up with the developers for further discussion at this point though.

Revision history for this message
Peter Clifton (pcjc2) wrote :

Assuming the $evildoer has no means to snoop the email which Launchpad sent out (a fair and necessary assumption IMO), sending an email detailing how to create an account should not constitute a security leak. If $user can receive email on the address provided, they have proved their link to that address by being able to receive the email.

Offering the user to create an account on the web form would be a clear information leak though.

Revision history for this message
Stuart Metcalfe (stuartmetcalfe) wrote :

Agreed, we should send a mail to the user inviting them to create an account.

Changed in canonical-identity-provider:
status: New → Confirmed
importance: Undecided → High
Revision history for this message
Charles Pergiel (c-pergiel-c) wrote :

Maybe I am blind, but I fail to see how acknowledging that any particular email address has an associated account at Launchpad could lead to a security breech. Methinks somebody's paranoia has gotten the better of them.

Revision history for this message
Stuart Metcalfe (stuartmetcalfe) wrote :

Confirming the existence of an account registered with a specific email address is the first step in a targeted phishing campaign. If a phisher can then cross-reference that address with data they've obtained from other sources, they can craft very convincing emails and web pages which regular users find very difficult to identify. I've seen these kind of targeted attacks in action and I've worked with a security consultancy to review similar projects in the past; this is not paranoia.

Revision history for this message
Charles Pergiel (c-pergiel-c) wrote :

Yes it is.

Revision history for this message
Selene ToyKeeper (toykeeper) wrote :

We talked about this on IRC and the consensus was to send a message to whatever address the user entered, either with a password reset code (if they have an account) or a clear message stating the address has no account but that they're welcome to make one.

Also, this came up repeatedly at the Support CoP meeting at UDS. It affects every login-based service and thus every support team and everyone wants it fixed ASAP. Can we do this soon?

tags: added: escalated
description: updated
Changed in canonical-identity-provider:
assignee: nobody → Simon Davy (bloodearnest)
Changed in canonical-identity-provider:
status: Confirmed → In Progress
tags: added: kb-task sp-1
tags: added: kb-defect
removed: kb-task
Revision history for this message
David Owen (dsowen) wrote :

toykeeper mentioned that if we began the registration process and sent the token/link to the user to confirm, some users would be more likely to create additional accounts that they don't want. If the user is hitting the situation in this bug, they are probably already confused about their accounts, so it sounds like sending only an invitation to register is a better approach.

Changed in canonical-identity-provider:
status: In Progress → Fix Committed
milestone: none → 12.01.05
Revision history for this message
Julien Funk (jaboing) wrote :

Some serious grammar issues in the email, should be fixed before release.

Changed in canonical-identity-provider:
status: Fix Committed → Fix Released
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