[MIR] Promote ruby-ffi to main a pcs indirect dependency

[Lucas Kanashiro]

[Availability]

The package ruby-ffi is already in Ubuntu universe.

The package ruby-ffi build for the architectures it is designed to work on.

It currently builds and works for architectures: amd64, arm64, armhf, ppc64el, riscv64, s390x.

Link to package [[https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/ruby-ffi|ruby-ffi]]

[Rationale]

The package ruby-ffi is required in Ubuntu main for ruby-ethon and ruby-childprocess promotions which are runtime dependencies of pcs (the main reason for this promotion).

Ideally, we expect that ruby-ffi (and pcs) will be promoted in the
"L" development cycle. The idea is to promote only the ruby-ffi
binary.

[Security]

Required links:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=ruby-ffi

A single CVE was found in 2018.

Nothing was found searching in the OSS security mailing list archive.

https://ubuntu.com/security/cves?package=ruby-ffi

One CVE found in the Ubuntu security tracker which does not affect any release.

No `suid` or `sgid` binaries.

No executables in `/sbin` and `/usr/sbin`.

Package does not install services, timers or recurring jobs.

Packages does not open privileged ports (ports < 1024).

Packages does not contain extensions to security-sensitive software
(filters, scanners, plugins, UI skins, ...).

[Quality assurance - function/usage]

The package works well right after install.

[Quality assurance - maintenance]

The package is maintained well in Debian/Ubuntu and has not too many
and long term critical bugs open

- Ubuntu https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/ruby-ffi/+bug
- Debian https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/pkgreport.cgi?src=ruby-ffi

The package does not deal with exotic hardware we cannot support.

[Quality assurance - testing]

The package runs a test suite on build time, if it fails
it makes the build fail, link to build log:

https://launchpadlibrarian.net/577911048/buildlog_ubuntu-jammy-amd64.ruby-ffi_1.15.4+dfsg-2_BUILDING.txt.gz

The package runs an autopkgtest, and is currently passing on this list of architectures: amd64, arm64, armhf, i386, ppc64el, s390x.

Link to test logs:

https://autopkgtest.ubuntu.com/packages/ruby-ffi

The package does not have failing autopkgtests right now.

[Quality assurance - packaging]

debian/watch is present and works.

debian/control defines a correct Maintainer field.

Lintian overrides are not present. Here is the output of `lintian --pedantic` against Kinetic version:

W: ruby-ffi source: unnecessary-testsuite-autopkgtest-field
P: ruby-ffi source: update-debian-copyright 2011 vs 2021 [debian/copyright:11]

This package does not rely on obsolete or about to be demoted packages.

The package will not be installed by default.

Packaging and build is easy, link to d/rules:

https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/ruby-ffi/tree/debian/rules

[UI standards]

Application is not end-user facing (does not need translation).

[Dependencies]

No further depends or recommends dependencies that are not yet in main.

[Standards compliance]

This package correctly follows FHS and Debian Policy.

[Maintenance/Owner]

Owning Team will be Server.

Team is not yet, but will subscribe to the package before promotion.

This does not use static builds.

This does not use vendored code.

This package is not rust based.

The package has been built in the archive more recently than the last
test rebuild.

[Background information]

The Package description explains the package well.

Upstream Name is: ffi

Link to upstream project: https://github.com/ffi/ffi/

[Ioanna Alifieraki (joalif)]

Review for Package: ruby-ffi

[Summary]
TODO: WRITE - TBD The essence of the review result from the MIR POV
MIR team ACK under the constraint to resolve the below listed
required TODOs and as much as possible having a look at the
recommended TODOs.
This does need a security review. Although, this package passes the
MIR security checklist, it is used to dynamically load other libraries
from inside ruby code and therefore I believe a security review is needed.
I don't assign the bug to security team until the required todos are addressed.
List of specific binary packages to be promoted to main: ruby-ffi

Notes:
TODO: - add todos, issues or special cases to discuss
Required TODOs:
1. Please make sure the latest version of ruby-ffi is packaged (1.15.5).
Current packaged version in both debian and ubuntu is 1.15.4 released
upstream in Sep 2021. The latest upstream release is 1.15.5 released in
Jan 2022.
Recommended TODOs:
- The package should get a team bug subscriber before being promoted

[Duplication]
There is no other package in main providing the same functionality.

[Dependencies]
OK:
- no other Dependencies to MIR due to this
  - ruby-ffi checked with `check-mir`
  - all dependencies can be found in `seeded-in-ubuntu` (already in main)
  - none of the (potentially auto-generated) dependencies (Depends
    and Recommends) that are present after build are not in main
- no -dev/-debug/-doc packages that need exclusion
- No dependencies in main that are only superficially tested requiring
  more tests now.

Problems: None

[Embedded sources and static linking]
OK:
- no embedded source present
- no static linking
- does not have unexpected Built-Using entries
- not a go package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- not a rust package, no extra constraints to consider in that regard
- Does not include vendored code

Problems: None

[Security]
OK:
- history of CVEs does not look concerning
- does not run a daemon as root
- does not use webkit1,2
- does not use lib*v8 directly
- does not parse data formats (files [images, video, audio,
  xml, json, asn.1], network packets, structures, ...) from
  an untrusted source.
- does not open a port/socket
- does not process arbitrary web content
- does not use centralized online accounts
- does not integrate arbitrary javascript into the desktop
- does not deal with system authentication (eg, pam), etc)
- does not deal with security attestation (secure boot, tpm, signatures)
- does not deal with cryptography (en-/decryption, certificates, signing, ...)

Problems: None

[Common blockers]
OK:
- does not FTBFS currently
- does have a test suite that runs at build time
  - test suite fails will fail the build upon error.
- does have a non-trivial test suite that runs as autopkgtest
- no new python2 dependency

Problems: None

[Packaging red flags]
OK:
- Ubuntu does not carry a delta (all 3 patches present, inherited from debian)
- symbols tracking not applicable for this kind of code.
- d/watch is present and looks ok (if needed, e.g. non-native)
- Upstream update history is (good/slow/sporadic)
- Debian/Ubuntu update history is slow
- promoting this does not seem to cause issues for MOTUs that s...

[Lucas Kanashiro (lucaskanashiro)]

Thanks for the review Ioanna!

I uploaded version 1.15.5+dfsg-1 to Debian unstable, once the archive opens for "L" it will be synced since we have no delta. And for the other TODO, yes, the server team will be subscribed before promotion.

[Christian Ehrhardt  (paelzer)]

Subscription is added and latest version packages -> move this to the correct "ready" state.

[Mark Esler (eslerm)]

I believe this was meant to be assigned to Ubuntu Security Team.

[Mark Esler (eslerm)]

I reviewed ruby-ffi 1.15.4+dfsg-2 as checked into kinetic. This shouldn't be considered a full audit but rather a quick gauge of maintainability.

> Ruby-FFI is a gem for programmatically loading dynamically-linked native libraries, binding functions within them, and calling those functions from Ruby code.

- CVE History:
  - CVE-2018-1000201
    - windows specific - DLL hijacking
  - open security issues in GitHub bug tracker
  - some merged PRs not closed
- Build-Depends?
  - lunar main
     - debhelper-compat (debhelper)
     - rake
     - libffi-dev (libffi)
  - lunar universe
     - gem2deb
     - ruby-rspec
- pre/post inst/rm scripts?
  - none
- init scripts?
  - none
- systemd units?
  - none
- dbus services?
  - none
- setuid binaries?
  - none
- binaries in PATH?
  - none
- sudo fragments?
  - none
- polkit files?
  - none
- udev rules?
  - none
- unit tests / autopkgtests?
  - contains build tests from upstream
  - has autopkgtests
    - failing on focal/i386 due to dependency resolution
- cron jobs?
  - none
- Build logs:
  - W: ruby-ffi source: unknown-field Ruby-Versions
  - W: ruby-ffi source: unnecessary-testsuite-autopkgtest-field [debian/control:17]

- Processes spawned?
  - benchmark, example, and spec files are not a concern
  - FFI::FfiGemHelper is okay
  - ./lib/ffi/tools/*_generator.rb files contain sharp code, downstream code may not apply it safely
    - downstream projects using this library with untrusted input or environment variables likely allow executing arbitrary code
    - this library should only be used in a closed system
- Memory management?
  - "FFI::MemoryPointer - allows for Ruby code to allocate native memory and pass it to non-Ruby libraries."
  - ruby-ffi does not work if PAX_MPROTECT is enabled
    - generally PaX is not for us
- File IO?
  - see temp file section below
  - benchmark, rakelib, debian, and spec files are not a concern
  - File.open() and File.binread() calls appear okay
- Logging?
  - *_generator.rb files redirect standard error from compiling C code to standard output
- Environment variable usage?
  - if an attacker can set the env variable CC, they might be able to run arbitrary commands with *_generator.rb functions
    - setuid use in dowstream projects requires scrutiny
  - ./ext/ffi_c/extconf.rb checks if RUBY_CC_VERSION is set
  - Rakefile, benchmark, and spec files are not a concern
- Use of privileged functions?
  - no, only in benchmarks
- Use of cryptography / random number sources etc?
  - none
- Use of temp files?
  - sample files are not a concern
  - *_generator.rb use tempfile to create C compiled code
- Use of networking?
  - none
- Use of WebKit?
  - none
- Use of PolicyKit?
  - none

- Any significant cppcheck results?
  - spec file results not relevant to MIR
- Any significant Coverity results?
  - Coverity results for build dependencies are not relevant to MIR, but will receive separate Security followup
  - Other results are spec files
- Any significant shellcheck results?
  - ./nbproject/Package-x86_64-Linux.bash results not relevant to MIR
- Any significant bandit results?
  - none

Examples in ./samples/ call shell.

It is unsafe to use this library, and likel...

[Christian Ehrhardt  (paelzer)]

Showing up in component mismatch now as planned.

[Christian Ehrhardt  (paelzer)]

Promoted together with the full PCS stack, details see https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/pcs/+bug/1953341/comments/13