Support Intel TDX guest attestation driver

[Andrea Righi]

[Impact]

Intel has requested to support the TDX (trust domain extension) guest attestation driver interface. In a TDX guest "attestation" is used to verify the trustworthiness of a TD (trusted domain) before provisioning secrets to the TD (i.e, encrypted keys to mount an encrypted rootfs, etc.).

During the TD boot the initial contents and configurations are recorded by the Intel TDX module in the build time measurement register (MRTD). At TD runtime, the Intel TDX module reuses the Intel SGX attestation infrastructure to provide support for attesting to these information.

This driver is targeting 6.x upstream, so we need to backport the upstream patches as SAUCE patches to properly support this feature in 5.19.

[Fix]

Backport upstream TDX attestation driver.

[Test case]

Tests have been performed by Intel, a test-case is included in the patch set as a kernel selftest (called 'tdx').

TODO: consider to integrate this test in our testing infrastructure once this feature has been merged.

[Regression potential]

This feature is self-contained, it's only available on amd64 and it doesn't affect any other amd64 code. So we could only experience regressions on amd64 systems that are using the TDX feature.

[Ubuntu Kernel Bot (ubuntu-kernel-bot)]

This bug is missing log files that will aid in diagnosing the problem. While running an Ubuntu kernel (not a mainline or third-party kernel) please enter the following command in a terminal window:

apport-collect 1988120

and then change the status of the bug to 'Confirmed'.

If, due to the nature of the issue you have encountered, you are unable to run this command, please add a comment stating that fact and change the bug status to 'Confirmed'.

This change has been made by an automated script, maintained by the Ubuntu Kernel Team.

[Ubuntu Kernel Bot (ubuntu-kernel-bot)]

This bug is awaiting verification that the linux-oem-6.0/6.0.0-1004.4 kernel in -proposed solves the problem. Please test the kernel and update this bug with the results. If the problem is solved, change the tag 'verification-needed-jammy' to 'verification-done-jammy'. If the problem still exists, change the tag 'verification-needed-jammy' to 'verification-failed-jammy'.

If verification is not done by 5 working days from today, this fix will be dropped from the source code, and this bug will be closed.

See https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Testing/EnableProposed for documentation how to enable and use -proposed. Thank you!

[Launchpad Janitor (janitor)]

This bug was fixed in the package linux - 5.19.0-18.18

---------------
linux (5.19.0-18.18) kinetic; urgency=medium

  * kinetic/linux: 5.19.0-18.18 -proposed tracker (LP: #1990366)

  * 5.19.0-17.17: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000084
    (LP: #1990236)
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Fix regression in stacking due to label
      flags"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: [Config] disable SECURITY_APPARMOR_RESTRICT_USERNS"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: Revert "hwrng: virtio - add an internal buffer""
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: Revert "hwrng: virtio - don't wait on cleanup""
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: Revert "hwrng: virtio - don't waste entropy""
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: Revert "hwrng: virtio - always add a pending
      request""
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: Revert "hwrng: virtio - unregister device before
      reset""
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: Revert "virtio-rng: make device ready before making
      request""
    - Revert "UBUNTU: [Config] update configs after apply new apparmor patch set"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: add user namespace creation mediation"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: selinux: Implement userns_create hook"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: AppArmor: Remove the exclusive
      flag"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full
      LSM context"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: LSM: Removed scaffolding function
      lsmcontext_init"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: netlabel: Use a struct lsmblob in
      audit data"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: Audit: Add record for multiple
      object contexts"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: audit: multiple subject lsm values
      for netlabel"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: Audit: Add record for multiple task
      security contexts"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: Audit: Allow multiple records in an
      audit_buffer"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: LSM: Add a function to report
      multiple LSMs"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: Audit: Create audit_stamp
      structure"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in
      audit_names"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: LSM: security_secid_to_secctx
      module selection"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: binder: Pass LSM identifier for
      confirmation"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a
      lsmblob"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in
      netlink netfilter"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: LSM: Use lsmcontext in
      security_dentry_init_security"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: LSM: Use lsmcontext in
      security_inode_getsecctx"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: LSM: Use lsmcontext in
      security_secid_to_secctx"
    - Revert "UBUNTU: SAUCE: lsm stacking v37: LSM:...