[19.10 FEAT] kernel address space layout randomization

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With kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR), the kernel can be loaded to a random location
in memory.

Protecting against certain attacks that rely on knowledge of the kernel addresses.

Available with kernel 5.2

[Frank Heimes (fheimes)]

Set to Incomplete until kernel 5.2 lands in eoan.

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------- Comment From <email address hidden> 2019-07-10 07:57 EDT-------
Git Commit for kernel 5.2 :
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cd479eccd2

[Frank Heimes (fheimes)]

$ rmadison --arch=s390x linux-generic | grep eoan-proposed
 linux-generic | 5.2.0.8.9 | eoan-proposed | s390x
$ git tag --contains cd479eccd2
Ubuntu-5.2.0-8.9
v5.2
$ git show cd479eccd2
commit cd479eccd2e057116d504852814402a1e68ead80
Author: Martin Schwidefsky <email address hidden>
Date: Mon Mar 4 12:33:28 2019 +0100

    s390: limit brk randomization to 32MB

    For a 64-bit process the randomization of the program break is quite
    large with 1GB. That is as big as the randomization of the anonymous
    mapping base, for a test case started with '/lib/ld64.so.1 <exec>'
    it can happen that the heap is placed after the stack. To avoid
    this limit the program break randomization to 32MB for 64-bit and
    keep 8MB for 31-bit.

    Reported-by: Stefan Liebler <email address hidden>
    Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <email address hidden>

With that changing status to Fix Committed.

[Frank Heimes (fheimes)]

Since kernel 5.2 eventually landed in eoan's release pocket:
  linux-generic | 5.2.0.8.9 | eoan | s390
I'm changing this LP ticket to Fix Released.

[bugproxy (bugproxy)]

------- Comment From <email address hidden> 2019-07-16 06:30 EDT-------
IBM bugzilla status -> closed, Fix Released with Eoan