stress-ng enosys stressor triggers a kernel BUG

[Andy Whitcroft]

We are seeing kernel BUGs when running the stress-ng enosys stresser on released trusty kernels.

[Kleber Sacilotto de Souza (kleber-souza)]

This bug is awaiting verification that the kernel in -proposed solves the problem. Please test the kernel and update this bug with the results. If the problem is solved, change the tag 'verification-needed-trusty' to 'verification-done-trusty'. If the problem still exists, change the tag 'verification-needed-trusty' to 'verification-failed-trusty'.

If verification is not done by 5 working days from today, this fix will be dropped from the source code, and this bug will be closed.

See https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Testing/EnableProposed for documentation how to enable and use -proposed. Thank you!

[Colin Ian King (colin-king)]

Tested with i386 and amd64 arches, fix works. Verified.

[Launchpad Janitor (janitor)]

This bug was fixed in the package linux - 3.13.0-143.192

---------------
linux (3.13.0-143.192) trusty; urgency=medium

  * linux: 3.13.0-143.192 -proposed tracker (LP: #1751838)

  * CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 retpoline)
    - x86/alternatives: Fix ALTERNATIVE_2 padding generation properly
    - x86/alternatives: Fix alt_max_short macro to really be a max()
    - x86/alternatives: Guard NOPs optimization
    - x86/alternatives: Switch AMD F15h and later to the P6 NOPs
    - x86/alternatives: Make optimize_nops() interrupt safe and synced
    - x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking
    - x86/cpuid: Provide get_scattered_cpuid_leaf()
    - x86/cpu: Factor out application of forced CPU caps
    - x86/cpufeatures: Make CPU bugs sticky
    - x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE
    - x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN
    - x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12]
    - x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors
    - x86/cpu: Merge bugs.c and bugs_64.c
    - sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder
    - x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions
    - x86/alternatives: Add missing '\n' at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm
    - x86/mm/32: Move setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID) earlier
    - x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value
    - x86/kbuild: enable modversions for symbols exported from asm
    - x86/asm: Make asm/alternative.h safe from assembly
    - EXPORT_SYMBOL() for asm
    - kconfig.h: use __is_defined() to check if MODULE is defined
    - x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
    - x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
    - x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
    - x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
    - x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
    - x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
    - x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
    - x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
    - x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
    - x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
    - x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning
    - x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros
    - module: Add retpoline tag to VERMAGIC
    - x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected
    - retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk
    - kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk
    - x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB
    - [Config] CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y
    - [Packaging] retpoline -- add call site validation
    - [Packaging] retpoline files must be sorted
    - [Config] disable retpoline for the first upload
    - [Config] updateconfigs - enable CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES

  * retpoline abi files are empty on i386 (LP: #1751021)
    - [Packaging] retpoline-extract -- instantiate retpoline files for i386
    - [Packaging] final-checks -- sanity checking ABI contents
    - [Packaging] final-checks -- check for empty retpoline files

  * CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre v2 Intel)
    - x86, microcode: Share native MSR...